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I. Introduction 
Securities fraud litigation visited the Supreme Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. v. Brouda,2 and left again unenlightened. The Court was asked to consider how 
investors could plead and prove causation. Specifically, the question was whether 
pleading that an investor paid too much for a stock on the day of purchase, and nothing 
more, adequately alleged that fraud caused a loss?3 The Court held that such a statement, 
standing alone, was not enough to plead (or prove) “loss causation” in these cases.4
Beyond that, the Court left the doors wide open: to plead causation in a securities fraud 
case, it said, a plaintiff should “provide a defendant with some indication of the loss and 
the causal connection that the plaintiff has in mind.”5 The Court explicitly stated that it 
was making no other ruling on proximate cause.6
Nonetheless, dicta in Dura created a battleground, namely, whether, after Dura, 
the only viable way to plead or prove loss causation is to demonstrate that the truth about 
corporate fraud was revealed, followed immediately by a drop in the corporation’s stock 
price.  
This view has gained some traction in the lower courts because it is superficially 
simple and logical. Losses occur every day in the rough and tumble of the market. 
Securities fraud laws are not a guarantee against those ordinary losses.  If a company 
publicly admits accounting irregularities, confessing that “we cooked the books,” and 
then its stock price drops, it is logical to infer that the fraud caused the drop and the 
company should be held responsible for it.  Investors who sell at that point have 
experienced a loss directly caused by the cooked books, so the reasoning goes, and their 
losses can be measured by the amount of the immediate drop, easily distinguished from 
the typical market “gamble” against which the law does not protect.    
2But can it be that “truth, then price drop” is the one and only template for 
pleading or proving cause in a fraud-on-the-market case?  And has the Socratic question 
“What is Truth” finally been answered?  Fraud is as varied as the corporate imagination; 
yet could the Supreme Court have intended to establish a narrow litmus test for pleading 
or proving it?  The Court seems to have made clear that it had no such agenda.7 It 
contemplated a robust examination of facts and circumstances and an ongoing debate 
about proximate cause.  Adopting a simplistic formula obscures the underlying economic 
principles that should guide these decisions and hinders continuing development of the 
law on causation that the Supreme Court expressly left open.  
A clear path exists back to the issues that should remain at the heart of the debate. 
The starting point is not new; it is based on long-established precedent and accepted 
economic theory. We express it as follows:  
Loss causation exists whenever fraud leads the stock 
price to be higher than it should be, the buyer pays “too 
much” for the stock, and the buyer is unable to recover 
that overpayment in the marketplace. 
This test is derived from formulations long accepted by courts, but it seems to have been 
lost somewhere in the litigation shuffle of confusing terminology and procedural 
vagaries. It is consistent with the economic, legal and public policy principles 
underpinning fraud-on-the-market cases and allocates relevant risks fairly to plaintiffs 
and defendants alike.  It mirrors what happens in the real world.  It is not foreclosed by 
Dura and in fact is entirely consistent with the same dicta that gave birth to the overly-
simplistic “truth then drop” formula.  So long as meticulous attention is paid to 
terminology and concepts are clearly provided and explained, it is readily accessible and 
understandable to fact-finders, be they courts or juries.  
 II. What is the Relevant Loss and How Does it Occur? 
3Our examination begins with the basics: what is a fraud-on-the-market securities 
fraud case and how do investors experience loss as a result of this kind of corporate 
wrong doing?  We approach the issues in lay, legal and econometric terms.  
A. What is loss? 
The stock market is presumed to operate on the efficient market theory.  An 
efficient market has many participants all of whom are implicitly trading in reliance on a 
stock price that they are entitled to assume fairly incorporates all public information.  The 
fundamental idea is the market reacts to all available information and the market will use 
that information to assess the present value of future cash flows of the firm, which in turn 
will set securities prices.  Price is a dynamic, not a static, concept and the market may re-
evaluate and re-price a stock on a daily, hourly or even momentary basis.   
The Supreme Court accepted the efficient market theory in Basic Inc. v. Levinson8
as the foundation of Section 10(b)(5) “fraud-on-the-market” cases.  In a fraud-on-the-
market case, an investor need not show actual reliance on a false statement; rather 
reliance is presumed.9 Moreover, in such a case, fraud has always come to light to some 
degree and in some way; otherwise, there would be no litigation. The controversial 
question is, once fraud has been established or pled, then when and how can investors  
establish that the fraud caused their losses.  
So how, in the real world, does loss occur due to fraud? A naïve investor might 
think that because fraud causes stock prices to go up, not down, everybody would make 
more money as a result.  But fraud infuses material information that is false into the mix 
of information underlying the stock price (or omits to state material information); the 
market values that false information or omission; and the over-all stock price is 
artificially inflated.  The value of the firm is set incorrectly because a falsehood has been 
issued or the truth has been omitted.10 The value of the false information (or the value 
incorrectly attributed to the price because true information is withheld) is sometimes 
4referred to in securities litigation as the “inflationary component” of the price.11 The 
stock then moves through the marketplace with both a true value and an inflation 
component, the latter of which is based on the fraud.  The stock’s “absolute” price – the 
dollar amount at which it is actually trading in the real world – will be composed, in other 
words, in part of true value and in part of inflation.  
We detour momentarily to comment on terminology.  In this area, the word 
“price” is used in surprisingly confusing ways.  Parties, commentators, experts, and 
courts, including the Supreme Court in Dura, may use the word “price” to mean “price at 
which the stock actually trades,” as we use it here, or, alternatively and without 
clarification, the “abnormal” part of the price infused into the stock by fraud.  “Value” is 
also sometimes used with similar lack of clarity. Likewise, “loss,” “investment loss,” 
“economic loss,” “inflationary loss,” and “transaction loss” may also be used 
indiscriminately. Here, we use “price” always to mean the price at which a stock actually 
trades; “inflationary component” or “inflation” means the part of the price infused with 
fraud; and “investment loss” means the difference between the price actually paid for the 
stock and the price at which it is sold (or the price on a measurement date required by 
law). “Inflationary loss” always means the loss due to the fraud and is measured by 
inflation on the day of purchase minus inflation on the day of sale (or measuring date).12 
To make clear our use of the terms “inflation” and “inflationary component,” 
assume the following example.  ABC Corporation announces that its new product sales 
exceeded analyst and investor expectations by 30% and are projected to continue to do so 
in the future. Say that the stock market responds by increasing the stock price to $130 
from $100 per share on the announcement, based on heightened expectations for sales 
(and corresponding firm value) in the future.  The announcement was completely false 
and a product of the company cooking its books.  The $30 increase, which we will 
assume is entirely attributable to the false announcement, is the “inflationary 
component.”13 An investor who purchased at the inflated price has paid too much.  That 
5inappropriate over-payment may eventuate in compensable loss, depending upon what 
happens next, as we discuss below.14 
Inflation can be introduced into a stock price without an absolute share price 
increase and even in the presence of a price decline.15 Consider the following two 
scenarios.  First, assume that on Day 1, XYZ Corporation’s stock is trading at $100.  On 
Day 2, XYZ reports that its earnings were in fact 50% below expectations and the stock 
price responds by dropping 50% to a share price of $50.  Alternatively, what if, on Day 2, 
XYZ concealed that the earnings disappointment was that big, and instead falsely 
reported that the earnings were only 10% below expectations?  The stock price drops by 
ten percent to $90 upon that news.  Inflation has still been introduced into the price, even 
though the price has gone down, and an investor who purchases a share on Day 2 has 
paid $40 too much.  Of the $90 price on Day 2, $40 is the inflationary component and 
$50 is the true value. 
We are distinguishing here between “what I lost due to fraud” and “what I lost in 
the stock market.”  This often confuses ordinary investors (and sometimes sophisticated 
ones), who, having lost a bundle, think that a securities fraud case will result in their 
recovering every dollar they actually lost.  Investment loss is not the same as inflationary 
loss. Many forces cause investment loss as a whole and securities fraud law is not 
concerned with restoring to investors their ordinary market losses.  Rather, the law is 
concerned with restoring to investors the inflationary component of price that they paid 
and cannot recoup in the market.  Thus, only inflationary loss can be viewed as caused by 
fraud and as legally cognizable.  It must be specifically identified and distinguished from 
the investment loss as a whole, often through statistical and other valuation techniques as 
we will further address.  
B. Inflationary Loss Occurs Whenever Inflation Cannot be Recouped 
 The apparent struggle in securities fraud cases to identify when a relevant loss 
has occurred is based on 1) confusion of terminology;16 2) failure to appreciate or accept 
the economics underlying the efficient market hypothesis;17 3) concerns about the nature 
6of the evidentiary proof of loss;18 and 4) concerns that the scope of potential liability is 
unfairly broad and must be minimized in every reasonable way.19 
These concerns can be minimized and met through an understanding of economic 
concepts. The identification of loss is conceptually simple and straightforward: 
inflationary loss occurs whenever an investor who paid too much is unable to get that 
overpayment back in the marketplace.20 
When an investor has paid an inflated price for stock, one of three things can 
happen.  First, she may resell the stock instantly to another buyer who pays her the same 
inflated price. In that instance, she has not been damaged and has experienced no 
compensable loss.21 Second, she may sell when the inflationary component has been 
reduced; however, she will not fully recover the over-payment she made.  She has 
experienced an inflationary loss in that instance.  Third, she may sell at a point in time 
when the inflationary component has actually increased, in which case she has innocently 
profited from the situation and has not experienced any kind of loss caused by fraud.22 
Whenever she continues to hold the stock until the inflationary component disappears, or 
dissipates, in whole or in part, she will not be able to resell and recoup fully the 
inflation.23 In other words, if, and only if, our investor cannot recoup the full amount of 
the overpayment that was infused into the price by fraud, she has experienced an 
inflationary loss. Her damages are properly measured, then, as the difference between 
inflation at the time of purchase and inflation at the time of sale. 24 
It is apparent, then, that there are two critical issues in examining inflationary 
loss.  First, how is the inflation in the price caused in the first instance?  Second, was the 
inflation dissipated and how?  
III. How Does Inflation Occur?  
When new, false, and material information enters the market (or true information 
is withheld), the efficient market hypothesis postulates that an inflationary component 
7will enter into the stock price.25 The market will operate on the fraud by valuing the 
material false information.  If the market did not do so, then fraud would never succeed.  
Like oxygen to a fire, market forces are therefore the crux of fraud-on-the-market 
cases, a necessary condition for the occurrence of the fraud in the first place. The 
defendant and the market are effectively acting together. Companies intent on wrong 
doing are setting out to (or expecting to) induce a reaction by the market to the false 
statement or omission. The defendant is trying to and does cause the market to drive up 
its stock price or prevent it from falling to its true value; either way, the purpose and 
effect is to cause the market to attribute artificial inflated value to the stock. That market 
reaction is by definition a foreseeable consequence of fraud. In fact, every day that the 
company withholds the truth after a false statement has been made, or continues to omit 
the truth from the market, the company as a practical matter is actively promoting the 
misrepresentation and inviting the market to price its stock with a fraud component. In 
other words, because the misrepresentation or omission is incorporated into the valuation 
process as soon as the new, material false information enters the market, as an economic 
matter, by definition, the defendants’ fraudulent conduct always causes artificial inflation 
to enter the price.26 
Misrepresentations can occur in countless ways, but the key to materiality is 
whether the misinformation concerns something that matters to investors.27 Companies 
are in constant communication with investors, analysts, their own shareholders, 
investment banks and they know what matters most: the company’s financial parameters 
and expectations, both qualitative and quantitative. Thus, fraud most often is related to 
things like statements of earnings per share, revenues, expenses, growth trends, margins, 
8demand, weaknesses in the fundamental health of the company, and similar crucial 
aspects of company fiscal performance.    
The tools that a company may use to commit fraud are, of course, legion and 
hardly require description, other than to note their creative variety.  Even a tiny sample of 
a few months worth of post-Dura opinions is instructive. Allegations of fraud have 
included: inventory schemes that exaggerate earnings;28 testing and valuation of goodwill 
that results in overstated earnings;29 heralding product performance and understating 
product risks;30 depressing projections in order to create “upside surprises” in the 
market;31 loans disguised as equity investments;32 factoring and securitization of 
worthless invoices;33 concealing declining demand through recognition of revenue for 
work not yet performed;34 overstating oil and natural gas reserves;35 “slow-boating” of 
orders (using very slow delivery methods so that the revenue could be booked upon 
shipment, even if customers did not want the goods until a later quarter);36 “channel 
stuffing” (inducing customers through price discounts and other concessions to submit 
purchase orders in advance of when they would otherwise do so) resulting in overstated 
revenues;37 contracts with undisclosed contingencies and kick-backs which misstate 
current prospects.38 Needless to say, the list could go on and on. The point is that such 
practices are the tools that enable a company to induce a market reaction that will 
impound an inflationary component into the stock price.  
 
IV.  How Does Dissipation Occur? 
Dissipation of the inflated component of the price can occur in a variety of ways, 
as cases have long recognized.39 The occurrence of dissipation is just as foreseeable a 
consequence of fraud as the inflation.  A company that introduces a false component of 
price into the market knows that the false component at some point will dissipate because 
9that is how the market works.  The exact means or events of dissipation may not be 
foreseeable, but that is of little import – a company introduces false information in order 
to induce a price reaction and knows at that very moment that subsequent circumstances 
of all sorts may alter that reaction and cause loss to subsets of investors.  Thus, regardless 
of the events that trigger the dissipation, the eventual realization of inflationary loss is 
reasonably foreseeable.  
This section discusses how dissipation occurs in an efficient market.  Each of 
these examples is founded on economic principles, practical observation of the activities 
of the market, and case law.40 Recall our initial hypothetical.  Assume that ABC 
Corporation announces that its new product sales exceeded analyst and investor 
expectations by thirty percent and are projected to continue to do so in the future.  The 
announcement was completely false and a product of the company cooking its books.  
The goal of the fraud is to mask declining demand and continue reporting growth.  The 
tools the company used were, say, accounting improprieties in violation of Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and sham transactions.  
A.  The fraud is revealed  
 The clearest and least controversial way inflation may dissipate is where the truth 
has been successfully withheld until a moment when the full truth is disclosed. On a 
single day, the market learns that ABC has used accounting improprieties and sham 
transactions to cook its books and mask declining demand.  The information may come 
from disclosures by the company, a regulator, or someone else – a knowledgeable 
informant comes forward; the company issues a mea culpa, in some form or another; the 
SEC investigates and announces the results; executives are indicted; the important details 
of the fraud emerge in one way or another.  A dramatic and immediate “stock price drop” 
would typically follow in an efficient market.  Coincident with that drop, and assuming 
there is no further “truth” to be told, all inflation will dissipate as well.  At that point, our 
investor can never recoup the inflated price and her inflationary loss is clear.  A full and 
complete revelation of the fraud, in a single blinding moment, is exceedingly rare.41 
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 B.  Improprieties are revealed 
Another common situation is revelation of “bad” conduct in a general sense.  An 
investigative reporter, a whistleblower, or an analyst with more information than others, 
may find out that ABC’s new product division has violated GAAP.  The full impact of 
the violation and whether it amounts to deliberate wrongdoing is not revealed, but if the 
information is new and sufficiently material, the market will nonetheless react by 
correcting the price and dissipating at least part of the inflation once again.42 
C.  Questions or Concerns are Raised 
Generalized concerns, short of statements about improprieties, may also reach the 
market.  For example, a newspaper reporter writes about indications that demand for 
ABC’s new products is softer than the company has represented it to be.  Or the company 
mentions in a morning conference call that sales at the new products division aren’t quite 
as brisk as they had hoped.  Either type of news may result in a market correction of the 
price and dissipation of the inflationary component of the price.43 
D.  True Financial Condition is Revealed  
News about the company’s true performance, revealing nothing about 
wrongdoing, can dissipate inflation as well.  Issuance of restatements, earnings warnings, 
or other statements about the true state of the company’s financial condition may trigger 
dissipation.44 Assume that ABC reports a flat quarter of new product sales. The market 
will likely re-price the stock downward at that point, including the inflationary 
component.  The fact that no wrongdoing or error has been identified is unimportant; 
new, material information that is based on a real world occurrence – the company’s true 
performance has entered the market and the market will react to that.45 Partial dissipation 
of the inflated price that our investor paid will have occurred upon the materialization of 
the risk.46 The investor is no longer in a position to recover fully the inflationary price 
she paid.  She has suffered inflationary loss at that point.47 
E.  Leakage of information 
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Dissipation often occurs as the market reacts to recurrent, partial revelations of 
any of the above-type of information.  This is known as leakage.  Whispers, gossip, 
rumor, blogs, tips - any of these may be sources of leaked information, all in advance of 
the ultimate disclosure of the whole truth.  Assume, for example, an informed Internet 
blog contains a rumor that a new customer does not like ABC’s new product and plans to 
scale back its orders.48 The blogger may be taken to mean that demand is tapering off; 
suppose someone responds to the blog and says the customer information is not correct; 
then the original author may offer additional support for his report.  An analyst may pick 
up the concern and get a confirmation or denial from the customer.  Bits and pieces of 
reports or disclosures may, thus, have one meaning to investors initially, but that 
understanding may be significantly altered by third-party investigations, follow-up news 
reports, industry announcements, additional company disclosures and other occurrences. 
Thus, inflation in the price of a security may be dissipated over time as a result of a series 
of partial disclosures or occurrences until the inflation is mostly extinguished at some 
point. 
As one decision, post-Dura, explained this phenomenon: 
Moreover, there are a variety of ways that inflated value can be dissipated short of 
corrective disclosures . . . . Dissipation may flow, for example, from ‘a growing 
quiet awareness of the part of certain highly sophisticated market participants-
arbitrageurs and sell-side analysts-that previously publicly available fact, which 
for a  time seemed unimportant, were in fact inconsistent with the misstatements.” 
(quoting Merritt Fox) 49 
Timing may matter as well.  Sometimes, unexpectedly good or bad news leaks 
into the market before a formal announcement. Say ABC formally announces a quarter of 
flat sales.  But the “conversation” described above among market participants in the days 
and weeks before the announcement may have already impacted the stock price.50 As a 
result of this phenomenon, ABC’s announcement may have little or no apparent impact 
on share price because the dissipating effect of the announcement will already have 
occurred and been absorbed.51 
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F.  Market Forces Operating on the Fraud  
The concept of “market forces operating on a fraud” and causing dissipation of 
inflation has not been well-explained in the case law and has caused needless confusion.  
It is rooted in sound economic theory and thirty-year old legal precedent, as well as 
accepted by courts. It is nonetheless controversial after Dura. It arises in the context of 
the question whether inflationary loss can precede any disclosure of information related 
to the fraud.  It is critical to keep in mind that this source of dissipation does not stand 
alone – a disclosure of truth, partial or otherwise, at some point is always a necessary 
predicate to the analysis (and, of course, a necessary predicate as well to anyone filing a 
lawsuit).      
Judge Sneed discusses  this concept in his well-known concurring opinion in 
Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,52 which was later adopted by the Ninth Circuit in 
Wool v. Tandem.53 He explained that the inflationary component of the price may go up 
or down, just like the non-inflationary component does, depending upon what market and 
industry forces are doing that day.  To illustrate, assume an investor purchases on the day 
that the false announcement by ABC has caused the share price to increase by thirty 
percent.  The next day, the industry in which ABC operates experiences an overall 
decline due to the introduction of unexpected, new and superior technology.  That decline 
will be reflected in ABC’s stock price – and the inflationary component of that price will 
go down along with the true part of the price. It would make little sense to postulate that 
only the “true” component of the price would be affectedIf the investor sells on that day, 
she has not fully recouped the inflationary price she paid and has suffered an inflationary 
loss due to the fraud.  As elaborated below, carried to its logical conclusion, all manner of 
events, including news about occurrences that are not specific to ABC or its industry – 
say, for example, weather-related catastrophes - can dissipate inflation.54 
To look at this more specifically, market forces and industry forces can cause 
significant changes in share prices as a result, among other things, of changes in market 
interest rates; levels of risk aversion; forecasts of future inflation rates and economic 
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growth rates; and forecasts of industry measures such as demand, profit levels; and 
required rates of return.  All of these changes alter investors’ estimates of future earnings 
and growth, drivers of share price.  Customarily, analysts evaluate share price based on 
multiples of earnings per share.55 The multiple at which a company’s share price is set is 
a function of the market and industry forces just identified, the quality of the company’s 
reported earnings, and the company’s unique position within its product and service 
markets.56 
The following example will illustrate how these forces interact. Assume ABC 
misrepresents and reports earnings per share of $0.80 when, truthfully, ABC’s earnings 
per share were $0.40.  Based on the reported $0.80 per share, analysts project earnings of 
$1.00 for the upcoming twelve-month period; they are assuming a growth rate of 25%.  
But if they had known the true $0.40 figure, they would have used that $0.40 in their 
projections and arrived at a figure for the next year of $0.50 per share. Assume that the 
multiple analysts ordinarily apply to ABC is 20 times the projected earnings per share (20 
times the $1.00 projection = $20 per share).  Had the truth been known, ABC would have 
been valued at 20 times $0.50 ($10 per share).  In other words, the share price has within 
it $10.00 of inflation caused by the misrepresentation.  
Now, to understand specifically the effect of market or industry forces on the 
price, assume that analysts foresee an industry-wide slowdown that causes them to decide 
that 20 is too high a multiple and that a more appropriate multiple is 10.  The stock price 
would then fall from $20.00 per share to $10.00 per share.  The inflation in the stock 
price likewise would fall proportionally from $10.00 per share to $5.00 per share.  Thus, 
market and industry forces have clearly operated on the inflationary component of the 
price.  
G. Collapse of the Company 
Another situation where there is dissipation of inflation but great controversy as to 
whether there would be compensable loss is where the business is wiped out by 
circumstances that cannot be shown to have a direct connection to the fraud.  For 
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example, the initial fraud caused inflation.  But dissipation was caused, for example, by 
weather or other catastrophe, leaving the plaintiff unable to recoup the inflationary price.  
Assume an investor pays $100 for a share of XYZ and XYZ is inflating its 
earnings by 100%.  If the truth were known, the share price would have been only $50 at 
the time of purchase.  Suppose further that XYZ’s operations are virtually destroyed by a 
hurricane and the company is forced to seek bankruptcy protection.  After the bankruptcy 
filing the share price falls to zero.  The remaining assets are sold for less than the amount 
of liabilities.  After that, the bankruptcy trustee finds out about and discloses that XYZ 
had fraudulently overstated its earnings.  If there had been no fraud, the investor would 
have purchased the share at $50 and sold at $0 and experienced a $50 investment loss. 
But in fact, the investor paid $100, sold at $0, and has experienced an investment loss of 
$100.  The inflationary component of that loss is $50 because she cannot recoup the 
overpayment in the market.   
In this situation the initial inflation was not shown or even supported by proof of a 
subsequent drop in stock price.  Rather, it is the trustee’s discovery that XYZ was 
inflating its earnings that establishes prior inflation.  And the trustee’s discovery occurred 
after the stock price had already fallen to zero. Thus, the absence of a stock price reaction 
to a revelation of fraud does not mean there was no inflation and does not mean that there 
was no dissipation of the inflationary component of price.  
H.  Interplay of Dissipating and Inflating Events and Manipulation of Market 
Reaction  
Dissipation will not necessarily happen unimpeded.  A company seeking to cover 
up fraud may attempt to control market reactions by issuing disclaimers or making 
additional false statements.  It may deliberately let some of the truth out, a little at a time, 
in anticipation of market reactions and in order to stay ahead of them.57 If the company 
decides at some point to reveal the fraud, it might make the announcement at the same 
time as it announces other bad news, and then blame any ensuing stock price drop on 
these other things going wrong. Sometimes, dissipating and inflating moments may occur 
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simultaneously. For example, an investigative report about allegations of cooking the 
books will often contain statements from the company denying the allegations and 
offering further assurances; the market may react by treating the various statements as 
balancing each other out; one may mute the other; or one may be given more weight than 
the other.58  
The potential for manipulation is thus quite high, higher if the courts use 
adjudicative rules that ignore the reality that the market itself is a necessary instrument in 
fraud-on-the-market cases. Suppose a newspaper reports that ABC has been overstating 
its earnings and has been misleading investors.  This news, if uncontested and from a 
credible source, would cause a significant decline in the common shares and would 
dissipate inflation. However, ABC, its accountants and certain security analysts deny the 
allegations in the news report and seek to minimize the importance of the alleged 
improprieties. The dissipating effect would be muted and the two conflicting pieces of 
information may well offset each other. Suppose the share price of the company in this 
example fell only from $40 to $39 and the fall is statistically insignificant. Unless courts 
recognize the interplay of these forces, the culprit company could argue that the news 
report constituted a public disclosure; invoke the “truth on the market” defense; and then 
assert that the misrepresentations were not material in the first place because the decline 
was not significant. Yet the company itself clearly diluted the market’s reaction.59 
The potential for manipulation can intensify.  Suppose two quarters later, ABC 
reports disappointing quarterly financial results, lowers its future earnings guidance, and 
the common share price falls from $39 to $30.  The company continues to dispute the 
allegations of accounting impropriety, but it would be effectively dissipating inflation 
nonetheless by revealing the “true” prospects for the company.  If, finally, ABC issues an 
earnings restatement six months later, the stock price is unlikely to react at all - because 
the news is not surprising and little or no inflation remains to be dissipated.  Suppose the 
stock price falls at that point from $25 to $24.50 per share (a 2% decline).  If later sued, 
the company could argue that disclosure of the restatement was the only corrective 
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disclosure; that there was no resulting statistically significant decline in the stock price 
when that happened; and that the initial misrepresentation therefore was immaterial. 
The correct economic and legal principles would recognize that inflating and 
dissipating events had occurred throughout this time frame and would rely on statistical 
studies and other techniques to tease out and untangle the impacts of the allegations, the 
disclaimers, the true information, and the ultimate admission of impropriety, so as to 
permit determination and quantification of loss. 
To sum up the principles discussed in this section, as one court aptly stated: 
 
[I]nflated stock prices can lead to a loss in one of two ways. First, there 
can be an external correction to the market, such as a corrective disclosure. 
Once the fraud is revealed, it no longer taints the stock price and the 
artificial inflation disappears. The result is a sale at true value, causing a 
loss based on the inflated price at the time of purchase. Second, there can 
be a market correction, where ordinary market forces affect the rate of 
artificial inflation. If, for example, the normal functioning of the securities 
market causes the inflationary effect to dissipate over time, a customer 
who buys and sells at inflated prices will still suffer a loss based on the 
inflated price at the time of purchase so long as the price was less inflated 
at the time of sale.60 
In every case, then, a disclosure of truth of some kind will trigger the lawsuit. But 
in every case, pre-disclosure occurrences such as leakage, news about company 
performance, honest statements by the company that reveal true risks, market forces 
operating on the fraud must also be considered to determine whether inflationary losses 
were caused to investors at all points in time along the way. 
V.   Event Studies Demonstrate Inflation and Dissipation 
What techniques will enable identification of inflation and dissipation at all of the 
relevant times? As in any other case, proof will consist of facts that appeal to logic and 
common sense of the jury; scientific studies; and expert opinion. The first, again, will be 
as varied as the facts and circumstances of any case; in some instances, materiality and 
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falsehood and impact on stock price may be so clear and obvious that the jury needs to 
hear little else. But it is overwhelmingly common for inflation and dissipation to be 
assessed by using econometrics, particularly an event study, and supported by expert 
testimony.  
Forensic experts agree generally on the techniques to be used to show inflation 
and dissipation in stock prices. The gold standard, accepted by courts and economists, is 
the event study, often aided by other tools such as valuation analyses.61 An event study is 
an examination of the association between news about a company, good, bad, or neutral, 
and stock price movements.  The researcher is examining whether the association 
between news and share price movements is strong enough to support an inference of, 
among other things, causation. If price movements are found that are unexplained by the 
“market model” and are statistically significant, individually or collectively, a causal 
connection between the event in question and movements is established.62 The study will 
separate out the effects of company-specific news on the stock price from the effects of 
market or industry forces on the price and thereby identify “true” price and the 
inflationary component of price. Typically, event studies work backward from what is 
ultimately determined to be a fair price, after dissipation of inflation, to determine how 
much inflation due to the fraud was contained in the price during the relevant time frame 
all the way back to the beginning.63 
An event study can be thought of as involving three interrelated stages.64 The 
first is review of all available public information, on a qualitative basis, to identify what 
investors would find “material,” guided by economic principles, literature, and the 
experience of the researcher.  This information can come from analysts’ reports, press 
releases, securities filings, news articles (newspapers and daily publications, as well as 
more general publications) and Internet bulletin board postings to the extent they appear 
to represent informed investors’ perceptions.65 
The second stage of the study involves identification of the relevant market and 
guideline or peer group companies and the construction of a “market model.” How the 
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relevant market moves is compared to the movement of the stock. How the peer 
companies’ stock moves is compared to the subject as well. The result of the second stage 
of the analysis is a market model that predicts the daily return of the security based on the 
daily returns of an appropriate mix of market indices and an industry index.   
In the third stage of the analysis, the security’s returns on identified event days or 
series of days are analyzed, looking at what the market and industry indices predicted and 
what the security actually did.  Put another way, these statistical techniques separate out 
the impact of market and industry forces on the price so that the impact of all company-
specific news (including news relating to the fraud) is isolated. 
In an event study, inflating and dissipating price movements are identified in 
percentage terms.66 Backcasting establishes what percentage of the stock price was 
unaffected by fraud, or in other words, the “true value,” typically expressed as a 
percentage of the trading price. Use of percentages in event studies to assess the 
significance of price movements is routine, just as it is in tracking stock price movements 
in the market.  Stock prices react in percentage terms and it is correct as a matter of 
economics to use percentage terms to examine those reactions.67 In addition, the 
researcher may consider making certain adjustments, the technicalities of which are set 
out in the footnote for the mathematically inclined.68 
The event study is therefore premised on analyzing whether there are statistically 
significant price movements in reaction to company specific news, market forces, and 
industry forces. However, analysis of a single day may not tell the whole story 
statistically in some situations. Common situations, as noted above, are 1) where the 
dissipating impact of bad news is muted by prior leakage; 2) where the dissipating impact 
of leakage is itself muted by confounding inflationary events such as denials by 
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management; and 3) omissions cases, where had the truth been known, the price would 
have dropped; and statistically significant price increases will therefore not be manifest.  
To address these situations, event studies may consider “event windows” or 
several days over time, looking at joint statistical significance.  In other words, if there 
are bits and pieces of bad news that cumulate over time, the aggregate effect will need to 
be considered.69 A day where movement is not statistically significant may be part of a 
series of days which, taken together, are highly statistically significant and reveal that, 
overall, the bits and pieces of information entering the market are having an impact 
beyond what could otherwise be explained by ordinary market and industry forces.  
Where these situations are involved, in other words, the event study cannot reliably 
confine itself to whether the stock price dropped significantly on one particular day.70 
For example, assume the situation above where a news report questions the 
accuracy of ABC’s earnings and ABC denies the report on the same day. If the event 
study were to look solely at that day, it may very well find no statistically significant 
price movements because of confounding or offsetting factors. If, however, over the next 
few days, more news reports pop up raising additional questions about aspects of ABC’s 
accounting, then the event study that looks at the cumulative impact of those several days 
may show a statistically significant movement.71 
At the end of the day, an event study can be used to identify what events were 
inflating and what events were dissipating and to estimate the “true value” and the 
“inflationary component” of the stock price at all relevant times. Such a study supports an 
initial determination of the difference between what the plaintiff paid and what the 
plaintiff should have paid for the stock. It relies on and presumes the truth of the 
allegations of the complaint; facts ascertained in discovery; or the actual proof at trial.  It 
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then assists in answering whether the market has corrected the price in such a way that 
investors cannot recoup the initial inflation and therefore have cognizable damages. 
Specific identification of inability to recoup limits the defendant’s liability to losses that 
it has caused – inflationary losses, not investment losses. An event study can support the 
determination of materiality, causation and damages; ultimately, it assists in identifying 
that liability for loss exists only where plaintiffs’ ability to recoup inflation does not.   
VI.  Valuation Techniques 
Event studies need not stand alone, of course. Other techniques may confirm the 
materiality of a statement and the fact and amount of inflation and dissipation. A 
valuation study, for example, is a typical way of looking at a company’s financials as 
they were represented to be and comparing that to the “true” financials, as they should 
have been. For example, a later restatement may capture the truth, or financials may be 
constructed based on a exhaustive forensic study of historical accounting treatments. 
Based on that evidence, an expert can assess the extent to which the key financial metrics 
were overstated and reliably estimate the difference between the prices at which the stock 
actually traded and what the price would have been if the truth had been known at 
relevant points in time.72 
VII.  How does the economic analysis fare in the courts?  
Given the simplicity of the economics involved, albeit requiring expert analysis, 
explanation, and testimony, what has happened in terms of establishing loss in real world 
securities fraud cases?  
In one sense, it is fair to say “not much” – so few of these cases historically have 
gone to trial that no well-developed case law regarding the proof of loss exists. Indeed, 
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nearly all of the case law regarding loss has arisen in the context of motions to dismiss, 
summary judgment, class certification, evidentiary battles (admissibility of expert reports, 
for example), or settlement (where additional considerations may be in play).73 Thus, 
courts have had to address the adequacy of loss causation and damages issues most often 
in a bare-bones context, most often a pleading.  This means that concepts of loss have 
developed somewhat in a vacuum, uninformed by what evidence would actually be 
required and adduced at the proof stage. While legally, the concepts of loss, causation 
and damages may involve separate inquiries or concerns, surely the latter does and should 
inform the former.74 Yet, here, much of the important legal developments have taken 
place without being trial-tested.  
And what a mish-mash resulted.  Courts plunged into questions of economic loss 
often on the pleadings or otherwise undeveloped records and became deeply mired in 
“proximate cause.” As arcane as any legal concept, proximate cause deals, of course, 
with the twin inquiries of what event in a chain of events can be fairly said to have caused 
a consequence and what policy choices should be made to fairly limit a defendant’s 
liability.75 Needless to say, discussions of proximate cause have, ever since Palsgraf,76 
been hallmarks of confusion and the same is true in securities cases.  As Prosser stated, 
“[p]roximate cause remains a tangle and a jungle, a palace of mirrors and a maze.”77 
In these cases, as well as in other contexts, courts have bifurcated the causation 
question into “transaction causation” and “loss causation.”  Putting aside whether the 
bifurcation makes any sense or was derived from appropriate common law principles,78 
the general rule is that the former is “but for” cause and the latter is “proximate cause.”  
Transaction causation postulates that the investor would not have purchased the stock if 
the truth had been told.  This “but for” cause is said to be a necessary but not a sufficient 
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condition for a finding of causation.  The second prong of the bifurcated analysis, “loss 
causation,” postulates that the loss claimed must have been caused by the fraud. 79 The 
analyses of this element have been poorly framed, tending to focus on investment loss as 
a whole, or, in other words, “why did the stock price decline?”  Since it is unarguable that 
stock prices decline for many reasons, that focus misses the point and, moreover, seems 
to drive the courts toward discussion of what should be irrelevant concepts like 
“intervening” or “superseding” cause, as they attempt to figure out if the fraud played a 
role in the decline.80 The right question, again, is the obverse: whether the decline led to 
the realization of inflationary loss.   
Nonetheless, courts came up with the divergent standards that led to the Supreme 
Court’s decision to accept certiorari in Dura.81 The Ninth Circuit, which long recognized 
that “inflation” was key, held that plaintiffs need only state that they paid an artificially 
high price.82 But it did not couple that standard with any requirement that plaintiffs 
explain what happened after that – did the inflation dissipate, what caused the dissipation, 
were they unable to recoup the inflationary price? The Ninth Circuit seemed content to 
await the evidentiary stage before tackling such issues. Other circuits insisted that 
“purchase time inflation” allegations are not sufficient and that such a pleading standard 
would be too broad. The Third Circuit, for example, noted that standard might allow 
plaintiffs to sell with the inflation still incorporated into the price, in which case she 
would not have been injured.83 Thus, disclosures correcting the misrepresentations were 
required. The Second Circuit announced a standard that focuses on what has to be 
disclosed, rather than on whether inflation and dissipation have been alleged: “The issue 
‘is whether the misstatement or omission concealed something from the market that, 
when disclosed, negatively affected the value of the security.’” The Court did not 
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specifically illuminate what it means by “value” in this context and it also uses the word 
“loss” imprecisely.84 Suffice to say, along with the courts, commentators have divergent 
points of view as well.85 
VIII.  Along Comes Dura 
Enter Dura. Styled as a pleading case, commentators and parties nonetheless 
hoped Dura would afford the court an opportunity to clarify loss causation concepts in 
securities fraud litigation.  The Court declined the invitation, other than in one narrow 
respect, leaving the doctrinal development to the lower courts and leaving the direction of 
that development wide open. 
The Court held that pleading purchase time inflation, without any other statement 
about causation, was inadequate to satisfy the element of proximate cause, or loss 
causation, in a securities fraud case.86 It reiterated the old standard that a plaintiff in a 
securities fraud case must plead and prove that “misrepresentations (or other fraudulent 
conduct) proximately caused plaintiff’s economic loss.”87 
Beyond that, the Court established a relaxed, undemanding rule, as we noted 
above: a plaintiff should “provide a defendant with some indication of the loss and the 
causal connection that the plaintiff has in mind.”88 The Court emphasized that it was not 
deciding any other questions related to proximate cause, loss causation, transaction 
causation, or damage calculations when it said:  “We need not and do not consider other 
proximate cause or loss-related questions.”89 The Court assuredly did not discuss 
econometrics, how damages are to be measured, finance theory, or other related subjects 
and clearly did not explicitly overrule any of its own or other precedent on those issues.90 
The holding of Dura is limited:  
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The Court’s holding in Dura is extremely narrow. It settles only one issue: 
We now know that a plaintiff who merely alleges and subsequently 
establishes, that a positive, materially false misstatement in violation of 
rule 10b-5 inflated the price she paid for a security has not done enough to 
establish causation in a fraud on the market case.91 
As another commentator put it, Dura “is a minimalist text, which holds only that payment 
of an inflated purchase price, without more, does not by itself constitute an actionable 
economic loss.”92 
Yet, notwithstanding this simplicity at first blush, a battleground has emerged. 
Beleaguered courts have been told that Dura means nothing and Dura changes 
everything.  We next explore whether Dura intended to or did preclude the application of 
the econometric and legal principles we have discussed here to securities fraud cases.  
 IX.  A Per Se Rule or On-going Development Consistent with Economics?  
One extant proposition is that Dura set highly restrictive rules regarding liability, 
causation, damages calculations and even damages methodologies.93 The arguments are 
drawn from the ambiguous dicta of the case and conclude that “truth plus drop” is now 
the exclusive means of establishing loss – in other words, loss is shown if, and only if, 
there is a “corrective disclosure” followed by an immediate price drop. Every other 
circumstance in which loss might occur is swept aside.94 
The argument has been constructed and reconstructed in many sources.95 
Essentially, it derives from what the Court said when it rejected the purchase time 
inflation pleading standard:  
 
For one thing, as a matter of pure logic, at the moment the transaction 
takes place, the plaintiff has suffered no loss; the inflated purchase 
payment is offset by ownership of a share that at that instant possesses 
equivalent value. plaintiff has suffered no loss; the inflated purchase 
payment is offset by ownership of a share that at that instant possesses 
equivalent value...Shares are normally purchased with an eye toward a 
later sale. But if, say, the purchaser sells the shares quickly before the truth 
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begins to leak out, the misrepresentation will not have led to any loss. If 
the purchaser sells later after the truth makes it way into the market place, 
an initially inflated purchase price might mean a later loss. But that is far 
from inevitably so. When the purchaser subsequently resells such shares, 
even at a lower price, that lower price may reflect, not the earlier 
misrepresentation, but changed circumstances, changed investor 
expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific facts, conditions, or 
other events, which taken separately or together account for some or all of 
that lower price.96 
The Supreme Court also quoted the Restatement of Torts 548A which said that a 
person who “misrepresents the financial condition of a corporation in order to sell its 
stock becomes liable to a relying purchaser “for the loss” the purchaser sustains “when 
the facts…become generally known” and “as a result” share value “depreciate[s].”97 
The argument that loss causation must be demonstrated in every case by a 
“corrective disclosure” of “the Truth” couples the Court’s illustration of why purchase 
time inflation does not necessarily always cause loss (with which we agree) with the 
court’s comment about the “truth” coming out and facts becoming known. The 
constructed per se rule, together with very narrow views of “what is Truth,” creates a 
Platonic paradigm that almost never happens in the real world. It looks like this: Loss 
causation can be shown only where 1) alleged fraud inflates the stock price; 2) the 
alleged fraud is fully disclosed in mirror image language to the market; 3) the stock price 
drops immediately in an otherwise serene market; 4) that price drop is the only 
cognizable loss; 5) no matter what else happened before the Truth, no one who sold 
before the Truth is injured.98 The price drop defines the loss and is linked to the fraud 
because, in this paradigm, no other forces are operative.  It is a “pure” situation in which, 
by definition, everything but the market’s evaluation of the fraud alone has been 
eliminated.99 
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The Court did not say or even imply that “truth, then price drop” was to become 
the only test of loss causation much less the sine qua non for measuring damages. In 
addition to its specific disclaimers and simple holding that we discussed above, the very 
dicta upon which these arguments are based acknowledge that “truth” may “leak” into the 
market. If that is so, then at the very least “complete revelation of fraud” cannot be the 
litmus test, because leakage by definition is the introduction of bits and pieces of 
information and therefore must be something short of “the Truth.” Moreover, by using 
the term leakage, the Court also implicitly acknowledged the phenomenon that the 
market may have anticipated an announcement – thus the “Truth” may not cause a drop 
at all. The Court further acknowledged that purchase time inflation “may” play a role in 
loss and thus, it would seem, if a plaintiff can plead and prove that it does in fact play 
such a role, the burden is met and the “truth only” test has to be rejected.  
The Court also specifically stated that fraud claims could relate to situations 
where the share’s higher price was lower than it would otherwise have been, necessarily 
implying that a “drop” is not the only operative fact to be examined in determining loss 
causation. Even the example it used in rejecting purchase time inflation – that the 
investor might resell at exactly the same inflated price – incorporates the reverse – the 
investor might resell at a different level of inflation and suffer loss. The implication of all 
of these points is that the Court was acknowledging the efficient market hypotheses, not 
rejecting it, and that it recognized the facts and circumstances of any given case have to 
be examined – under a relatively relaxed standard at the pleading stage – to determine if 
loss causation exists.  
X. Post-Dura Decisions: Any More Clarity?  
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So what did the lower courts do immediately after Dura? Did they leave room 
after Dura for the right economic principles that ought to be driving the analysis? Or did 
they get as stuck afterward as before, but in a different bog? 
Both. In the immediate aftermath, courts started down the path of focusing on the 
nature and extent of “corrective disclosures,” always with an emphasis on the nature, size 
and immediacy of stock price drops. Some courts have fashioned a per se rule that loss 
never occurs before “Truth” is revealed and then define “Truth” with varying degrees of 
stringency,100 scrutinizing “the” disclosure for the extent to which it precisely reverses 
the prior misrepresentation or confesses to fraud.  
This approach has several negative consequences. First, it would deprive persons 
who actually suffered inflationary loss from any recovery. If any price drop prior to “the” 
corrective disclosure is, by definition and as a matter of law, caused by something other 
than fraud, those who sold before “the” disclosure are deemed to be undamaged. Yet, as 
we have shown, people who sold before a disclosure may well have sold after the 
inflation in their stock has dissipated through the various means other than “Truth” that 
we have described. They have not been able to recoup their overpayments. Yet the 
operation of the per se rule would mean that once an initial investment has been made, 
the investor bears the risks of everything that the market may do, up until the point that 
wrongdoing comes to light, and notwithstanding that the silent defendant is actively 
participating in the market reaction, every day. Thus, under this view, all investors who 
sell before the fraud is known must bear the risk that the market has operated on the fraud 
and deprived them of the opportunity to recover all or part of the inflationary component 
of price. At bottom, this rejects the economic fact that market forces operate on a fraud; 
put differently, it regards undisclosed fraud as an ordinary market risk that investors are 
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expected to bear. This logic is utterly contrary to the purpose of securities fraud law to 
prevent that particular risk from entering into the marketplace in the first instance. It is 
not something the Supreme Court articulated in Dura. 
Second, because this approach effectively establishes a presumption of “no loss 
causation,” it gives defendants a wild card. If liability attaches only when disclosure of 
falsity or wrongdoing occurs and a prior misrepresentation is reversed, the incentive to 
manipulate information is greatly enhanced. Companies would be affirmatively 
encouraged to “guide down” expectations in order to mute the impact of fraud. The more 
successfully the company could leak information and slowly let the air out of the 
“inflation balloon,” the better off it would be, if this were the rule.101 That again distorts 
the policy goals of the securities laws and again was not discussed by the Supreme Court 
in Dura, notwithstanding that the point was raised.102 
Third, the rule encourages or eventuates in procedural distortions. If plaintiffs 
must demonstrate that a moment of pure “Truth” happened, courts end up flyspecking the 
complaint for mirror image language reversing the prior misrepresentations, rather than 
looking at whether plaintiff has in fact pled that material misrepresentations were made 
with scienter. If market declines and their causes must be scrutinized at the pleading 
stage, courts are making complex economic decisions without the aid of discovery, 
evidentiary support, or comprehensive understanding of the economics underlying stock 
price movements. Motions to dismiss effectively convert into summary judgments and 
plaintiffs with valid inflationary losses may be inappropriately barred.103 
On the other hand, the economic principles we have discussed have been given 
play by other courts. Some recognize that disclosures may be required, but need not 
identify fraud or wrongdoing (Category C). Honest information about the company may 
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be sufficient (Category D above)104 or leakage of troubling information will be enough 
(Category E)105. Some have rejected the idea that Dura requires “a corrective disclosure” 
at the pleading stage.”106 At least one court has reaffirmed the Sneed concept of market 
forces operating upon the fraud, recognizing that traders may suffer loss before any 
disclosure because inflation has been dissipated before that and they cannot therefore sell 
at the same inflated price they paid. (Category F).107 
On the whole, however, these cases shed little light on analysis of loss causation, 
what it should be, and how it can be shown. To the extent the courts are stuck in the 
exclusive paradigm of “truth plus price drop,” they are imposing the “Platonic ideal” we 
identified above, which only remotely reflects the real, rough and tumble world of stock 
market fraud. At the core of the problem, it seems that discussions focuses, too often, on 
the incorrect loss causation question we also identified above: what are all of the forces 
that caused the stock price to decline? Focus on the decline, or in other words, the entire 
investment loss, is mistaken; the right question is whether the decline allowed 
inflationary loss to manifest and the fraud component of the price to become 
unrecoverable in the market.  
What generated this misdirected focus? Is it that plaintiffs have tended to plead or 
ask for their entire investment loss instead of just inflationary losses? Is that the 
predictable consequence of pleading “purchase time inflation” alone without any 
explanation of the links between the initial fraud, market activity, and recoverable loss? 
Is it due to the procedural posture of the cases – since these issues are raised so often at 
a non-evidentiary stage, have the economics simply not been presented? Do the courts 
fundamentally distrust jury and experts and so believe that inflationary loss cannot in 
fact be reliably demonstrated and Rule 12 needs to be harnessed to cut off trouble at the 
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pass? Is it because events studies and other financial techniques have not been used in 
the pleading preparation stage and, so, not much can be said about inflationary loss upon 
a motion to dismiss? Or is it a policy choice – even if fraud did cause inflationary loss, 
do courts prefer to confine the evidence to just one kind of proof, the tempting per se 
rule purportedly drawn from Dura?
Whatever has caused (no pun intended) the focus to be on investment loss instead 
of inflationary loss, much room for development of the right rule remains. A clear 
exposition of inflationary loss and its interrelationship with damages actually can be 
found in the case law, recognized by Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit. In Movitz v. 
First National Bank,108 the court considered a breach of contract and breach of fiduciary 
suit. The buyer had purchased property that the bank had negligently failed to evaluate; 
it failed to let the buyer know that the property was in bad shape. The housing market 
then tanked and the buyer lost his entire investment. The buyer sought and proved his 
entire investment loss at trial, making no effort to separate out only what he overpaid for 
the property as a result of the negligence – it was undisputed that the property had some 
worth, even in its true condition.  The Court of Appeals ruled that he had failed to prove 
that his investment losses were proximately caused by the negligence.   
But Judge Posner, with the benefit of a full trial and of hindsight as to what 
proof of overpayment loss would look like, went on to recognize that the buyer could 
have put on testimony about the true value of the property on the date of purchase, 
assuming the bank had done its job. The buyer could have separately identified the 
overpayment the buyer made (inflation); proven the market crash that made the 
overpayment unrecoverable (inability to recoup); and, according to Posner, the buyer 
could have recovered that part of the total investment loss.109 
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This is essentially the rule we are advocating in securities fraud cases.  Once it is 
shown that “but for” the misrepresentation the plaintiff would not have overpaid, the 
loss causation question turns only on inflationary loss. All of the myriad reasons for a 
price decline as such become part of the story as to why or to what extent recoupment is 
no longer possible, but are not dispositive as to proximate causation.  
But what of the concern that market forces are beyond the defendant’s control and 
hence liability will simply be too broad and defendants held responsible for ordinary 
risks against which the law does not insure? If one follows Posner’s rule and ours, 
focusing on the inflationary loss, not the investment loss for which no recovery is 
available, that concern is not present. After all, the defendant entirely controls its own 
actions: committing fraud in the first place and inflating stock prices; manipulating 
information and other company conduct; keeping schemes going by refraining from 
truth and thus continuously participating actively in the fraud; and knowing, foreseeing,
without any doubt, the consequence is that market forces will operate on both the true 
value and inflationary part of stock price throughout the life of the misrepresentation. 
Those market conditions over which the defendant has no control are nonetheless 
exactly what allow the fraud to have value and the defendant’s responsibility will be 
limited to that value.  
In other words, once a security’s price has been inflated by fraud, dissipation of 
the inflation will ultimately result in loss. Dissipation, whatever its particular trigger or 
triggers, is not an “intervening” or “superseding” cause of loss or even a “substantial 
factor” in the loss. Rather, it is a necessary condition of the loss in every instance and a 
foreseeable consequence of the fraud. As we have demonstrated, the market and its 
reactions are as necessary to fraud-on-the-market as oxygen to a fire.110 
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XI.  Conclusion  
 
So now what? It is apparent that Dura did not truly clarify loss causation and that 
the lower court decisions since then have not been especially illuminating; other than to 
exhibit a leaning, perhaps, towards the seemingly safe harbor of “truth, then drop.” 
Inflationary loss seems lost in the shuffle, notwithstanding that from the point of view of 
economics, it clearly should drive the analysis. So what should parties and courts do? 
 Particularly given the Supreme Court’s emphasis that “pleading rules are not 
meant to impose a great burden upon a plaintiff” and that “some indication” of loss and 
the causal connection the plaintiff has in mind should suffice, it would seem that at the 
pleading stage, a “short and plain” statement is still the standard. Pleading the 
misrepresentations or omissions, that they inflated the purchase price, and that the 
inflated component of the price subsequently dissipated causing inflationary loss is a 
minimal requirement.111 
But as a practical matter, the Complaint probably needs to do more than that in a 
post-Dura world. Although the Court did not hold that loss causation must be pled with 
particularity,112 it seems evident that particularity is one protection against dismissal in 
any case where the pure paradigm cannot be pled. To be sure, if it can be pled, it should 
be. Where there is something close to a mirror image disclosure of truth to reverse the 
prior misrepresentation, a dramatic stock price drop such that market and industry forces 
seem highly unlikely to explain all of the decline, even a stringent court may find that 
sufficient, at least as to post-disclosure holders and sellers of the stock.113 
But even in these instances, the course of dissipation preceding the final 
disclosure that in turn precipitated the Complaint may be much more complex. Investors 
who bought and sold before the triggering disclosure may have losses and those losses 
should be pled as well and recognized by courts. In that case, the facts must be 
scrutinized to determine whether they fit any of the economic patterns we have described. 
For example, inflating and dissipating events may have shored up the price or let the 
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inflation out a little at a time. A concealed risk may have materialized – as information 
entered into the marketplace that turned the lights on, perhaps dimly at first but 
eventually with bright clarity, either, for example, disclosures of company-specific news 
about the subject matter of the fraud or about the true performance of the company.  
Moreover, new precipitating even relatively small price drops may translate into 
significant inflationary loss and those effects, too, must be examined at the outset, 
because the market may have anticipated a disclosure and dissipated inflation prior to 
“the Truth.” Relying solely on stock price movements, however, will rarely be sufficient 
to plead loss causation because raw price movements alone mean only investment loss 
and do not necessarily tell the court or the defendant what the pleader “has in mind” with 
respect to inflationary loss.  
Clear explanations of all of these forces at work are necessary in the pleading 
itself – a narrative story of how and when inflation entered the price and how and when it 
was dissipated, just like the narratives commonly given at length about how the fraud 
happened. This may be the only safe bet in a post-Dura world. Although pleaders are 
often reluctant to have their hands tied by pleadings that are too detailed, nonetheless, the 
balance needs to tilt toward “more not less” when it comes to causation and an 
explanation of the underlying economics. Defendants, in other words, will be given more 
than just “some indication” of what is behind the plaintiffs’ concept of loss. Courts will 
be aided greatly by clarification and detail. 
In complex cases, expert help will likely be needed at the pleading stage and the 
court may have to be educated, through the pleadings or through the briefs, about the 
economic theories underlying the claims. Expert help at the outset of a case is required in 
other contexts and we believe it is bound to be helpful, if not mandatory, here. Thus, the 
assistance of accountants, finance professionals, valuation experts, or economists, can 
confirm the presence of, if not the exact amount or precise changes in, inflationary loss 
for pleading purposes. A rough and ready review or valuation analysis may suffice in 
many situations and could likely be done with the aid of analyst reports and other 
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information available in the market.  But an event study of at least modest scope may also 
be needed, depending upon the facts of the case. 
We have advocated a broad standard for loss causation rooted in economic theory 
and common sense. It is not endorsed by Dura nor is it precluded; it accepts the Court’s 
invitation to further explore loss causation. It focuses on the existence of inflationary 
loss, the only form of loss compensable in these cases. It is not controlled by the question 
of why the stock price declined, but rather whether the inflationary loss can be recouped.  
It results in fair allocation of risk; the defendant bears only the risk of losses caused by its 
have placed fraud into the marketplace; plaintiff bears only the risk of the investment 
losses that would have occurred in any event and without the fraud.  By the same token, a 
focus on inflationary loss actually requires the precision in pleading loss and loss 
causation that was absent in Dura and has been absent much of the time.  It balances 
plaintiffs’ need in appropriate cases to proceed to the stage of discovery and proof; the 
defense need to avoid the in terrorem effect of groundless claims; and offers the courts a 
clearer standard, grounded in reality, to apply.  
 
1 Dr. Hakala is an economist, financial analyst and Director of CBIZ Valuation 
Inc. Ms. Thorsen and Mr. Kaplan are trial lawyers and partners in Thorsen 
Kaplan, L.L.P.  Dr. Hakala has testified for plaintiffs in securities fraud cases, and 
for plaintiffs and defendants in other valuation matters. Ms. Thorsen and Mr. 
Kaplan have each represented plaintiffs and defendants in securities fraud cases.  
The points of view expressed herein are those of the authors and do not reflect the 
views of their clients, CBIZ Valuation or Thorsen Kaplan L.L.P. The authors 
acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Shannon N. Lambert Cooper, 2005 cum 
laude graduate of the University of Minnesota Law School.   
2 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005). 
3 Id.
4 Id. at 1631. 
5 Id. at 1634. 
6 Id. at 1633-34 (emphasis added). 
7 Id.
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8 485 U.S. 224, 248 (1987). 
9 Basic, 485 U.S. at 225.  The Court referred to two prominent articles on the 
efficient market hypothesis.  See Roger J. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient 
Capital Market Model: A Recipe for the Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373
(1984) and Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud 
Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. L.J. 1 (1982). The Supreme 
Court has not questioned Basic v. Levinson, nor has Congress ever legislated to 
alter the Supreme Court’s interpretation in that respect; thus, the efficient market 
theory remains the foundation of the fraud-on-the-market cause of action and we 
accept it fully here. Some, however, have queried how efficient the market really 
is and whether the theory should hold in every instance. See, e.g., William O. 
Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in a Time of 
Madness?, 54 EMORY L.J. 843 (2005). There are variants on the efficient market 
theory that we do not address herein, other than to note that Basic is viewed as 
adopting the “semi-strong” form of the hypothesis.  See, e.g., In re Res. Am. Sec. 
Litig., 202 F.R.D. 177, 189 n. 12 (E.D. Penn. 2001). 
10 As noted, either affirmative misrepresentations or omissions may cause this. 
For convenience, we do not consistently separately address omissions nor the 
more unusual situations where fraud is intended to deflate price.  Similarly, we 
use ordinary stock purchases and sales in our examples, not situations such as 
options or short sales. The economic principles discussed herein apply, however, 
to these fact patterns as well.  
11 In statistical terms, it may also be called the “abnormal return” or the “residual 
return.” 
12 Legal terminology related to causation is also confusing – “transaction 
causation” and  “loss causation” are actually poorly defined concepts, see infra 
notes 73-85 and accompanying text, but loosely, transaction causation may be 
associated with the investment loss and loss causation associated with the 
inflationary loss.  
13 That would be true if it were an uneventful day for the stock market and ABC’s 
industry generally and if the unexpected positive announcement was the only new 
material information that occurred on that day.  Needless to say, the real world is 
often – if not always - more ambiguous.  
14 See infra notes 39-60 and accompanying text. 
15 See, e.g., In re Bristol Meyers Squibb Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 2007004 (D.N.J. 
2005); Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 419 (5th Cir. 2001) (“We also 
realize that in certain special circumstances public statements falsely stating 
information which is important to the value of a company’s stock traded on an 
efficient market may affect the price of the stock even though the stock’s market 
price does not soon thereafter change.”) 
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16 John. C. Coffee, Causation by Presumption: Why the Supreme Court should 
Reject Phantom Losses and Reverse Broudo, 60 BUS. LAW. 553 (2005) 
(hereinafter Coffee, Causation by Presumption).  We have addressed the 
terminology problem and believe clear, consistent definitions can go a long way 
toward resolving confusion.  See supra note 12 and accompanying text.   
17 See Coffee, Causation by Presumption, supra note 16, at 534; 547 (expressing 
skepticism that the efficient market theory can be properly understood by jurors 
and querying whether Basic should be “significantly curtailed.”)  
18 Professors Coffee and Fox have debated this point. Compare Coffee, Causation 
by Presumption, supra note 16 with Merritt B. Fox, Demystifying Causation in 
Fraud on the Market Actions, 60 BUS. LAW. 507 (2005) (hereinafter Fox, 
Demystifying Causation).  
19 Judge Henry Friendly called this a concern over “fraud by hindsight.”  Denny v. 
Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978).  Defendants frequently complain that 
securities fraud litigation is “a restatement [of earnings] in search of a fraud.” See, 
e.g., In re Sawtek, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 2465061 (M.D. Fla. 2005).  The 
legitimacy of the complaints about securities fraud litigation in general and class 
actions in particular is beyond the scope of this review.  See generally the 
Coffee/Fox debate, supra note 18. 
20 Judge Sneed in his concurring opinion in Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,
541 F.2d 1335, 1341-46 (9th  Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring) put forward this 
basic idea, although his language was not as precise as it might have been, which 
in turn has generated some additional confusion that echoes throughout the 
subsequent case law. See, e.g., Wool v. Tandem, 818 F.2d 1433, 1436-37 (9th Cir. 
1986) (partially adopting and partially criticizing Sneed’s concurrence). A useful 
discussion of the concept is contained in Fox, Demystifying Causation, supra note 
18, at 515 (explaining that in a fraud on the market case, “the claimed loss – that 
plaintiff paid too much – flows directly from the misstatement.  If proved true, the 
resulting damages paid to the plaintiff compensate the plaintiff for that loss and 
nothing more.”)  
21 The Supreme Court said as much in Dura Pharma., Inc. v. Bouda, 125 S. Ct. 
1627 (2005).  “[A]t the moment the transaction takes place, the plaintiff has 
suffered no loss; the inflated purchase payment is offset by ownership of a share 
that at that instant possesses equivalent value . . . .”  Id. at 1632 (emphasis in 
original).   
22 This is sometimes referred to as “inflationary gain.” It can be a distressing 
concept to investors that one can have an investment loss (actual loss of real 
dollars) but have sold at a time when the inflationary component in the price has 
gone up and thus, no fraud recovery is available notwithstanding the 
disappearance of real dollars.  It is the correct economic analysis, however. 
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23 This is not to say that the investor has or should have some duty or obligation to 
sell at just the right time to recover the inflationary loss; that would be an 
impossible, unfair expectation even for professional investors.  
24 This damage measure is well recognized. See, e.g., Michael Barclay & Frank C. 
Torchio, A Comparison of Trading Models Used for Calculating Aggregate 
Damages in Securities Litigation, 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 106 (2001) 
(stating: “In general, damages per share are calculated as the artificial inflation 
when the shares were purchased minus the artificial inflation when the shares 
were sold.”); John Finnerty & George Pushner, An Improved Two-Trader Model 
for Estimating Damages in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 8 STAN. J. L. BUS. &
FIN. 213 (2003)(discussing a damage model that measures damages based on 
inflation at time of purchase minus inflation at time of sale and allows for “in-
and-out” or selling damages); Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan, Using 
Finance Theory to Measure Damages in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 UCLA 
L. REV. 883, 885-86 (1990) (“. . . the measure of damages for an investor is 
simply . . . , for plaintiffs who sold their securities before the [final] corrective 
disclosure, the difference between the price inflation at the time of purchase and 
the price inflation at the time of sale.”). The same measurement is applied to 
holders of stock through the end of a class period – inflation at the time of 
purchase minus inflation at the date of measurement. The PSLRA also contains a 
cap on damages based on a 90-day look back period at the end of a class period. 
15 U.S.C. §78u-4(e).   This damages measure is sometimes referred to as the “out 
of pocket” rule, but that term, too, can be confusing and it is used in different 
ways. In Daniel P. Lefler & Allan W. Kleidon, Just How Much Damage Did those 
Misrepresentations Actually Cause and to Whom: Damages Measurement in 
“Fraud on the Market” Securities Class Actions, 1505 PRACT. LAW INST. 285 
(2005) at 7, for example, in the course of a single discussion, the authors use the 
term alternatively to mean “investment loss” and “purchase time inflation.”  To 
avoid such confusion, we do not use the term herein. 
25 A classic legal test of whether a market is efficient is stated in Cammer v. 
Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989). See also In Re Polymedica Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 224 F.R.D. 27 (D. Mass 2004)(general discussion of efficient market 
theory in both legal and economic contests and of tests for efficiency of any given 
market). 
26 Meritt B. Fox, Understanding Dura, 60 BUS. LAW. ___, ____ (2005) 
(hereinafter Fox, Understanding Dura)(“The defendant’s misstatement injures the 
plaintiff not because it caused her to make a purchase that later, ex post, turned 
out to be a losing transaction, but because, ex ante, it caused her to pay a purchase 
price that is higher than it would have been but for the misstatement.”); Fox,  
Demystifying Causation, supra note 18. 
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27 Coffee finds the term “material” problematic because a jury may think that 
“material” simply means “important” in some colloquial sense. Coffee, Causation 
by Presumption, supra note 16. This is an evidentiary point to be addressed 
through expert testimony, jury instructions, judicial oversight, and the common 
sense of the jury. See e.g., NASDAQ’s guidelines for material news as set forth in 
the Federal Register, Vol. 67, No. 157, August 7, 2002, pp. 51306-51310.  
Mistrust of the jury process also plays a significant role in the argument for 
stringent pleading standards. See Coffee, Causation by Presumption, supra note 
16.  The high rate of settlement of securities fraud cases is sometimes said to be 
evidence that frivolous cases and strike suits are frequent, but it may equally 
signal corporate management’s reluctance to allow ordinary folks to decide if they 
committed fraud and to be exposed to potentially large verdicts.   
28 In re Greater PA Carpenters Pension Fund v. Whitehall Jewellers, Inc., 2005 
WL 61480 (N.D. Ill.). 
29 In re Acterna Corp. Sec. Litig., 378 F. Supp. 2d 561 (D.Md. 1005). 
30 In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 2007004 (D.N.J.). 
31 In re IPO Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 1162445 (S.D.N.Y.). 
32 In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
33 Id.
34 In re Portal Software Inc. Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 1910923 (N.D.Cal.) 
35 In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transport Sec. Litig., 380 F. Supp. 2d 509 (D.N.J. 
2005). 
36 In re Sawtek Inc. Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 2465041 (M.D.Fla.) (also alleging the 
creative plan to use a two-hour time difference between its Florida and Costa Rica 
offices to “extend” its quarter by operating out of Costa Rica for two extra hours 
after the quarter closed). 
37 In re Synovis Life Technologies, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 2063870 (D.Minn.). 
38 In Re Tellium Inc. Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 1677467 (D.N.J.). 
39 Gebhardt v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 335 F.3d 824 (8th Cir. 2003), reh'g denied,
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 17920 (8th Cir. 2003); No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint 
Council Pension Trust Fund v. America West Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920 (9th 
Cir. 2003); Knapp v. Ernst & Whinney, 90 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1996); In re 
Control Data, 933 F.2d 616, 619 (8th Cir. 1991); In re Dynegy, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
2004 WL 2308799 at *46 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2004); Swack v. Credit Suisse First 
Boston, 383 F. Supp. 223 (D. Mass. 2004); In re IPO Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 
281, 377-78 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re WorldCom, 2003 WL 22420467 at *29 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Retsky Family Ltd. P'ship v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 1998 WL 
774678 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 1998); and In re Blech Sec. Litig., 961 F. Supp. 569, 
586 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).   
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40 Our examples are not without controversy, especially after Dura Pharma., Inc. 
v. Brouda, 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005) as elaborated below, see infra notes 100-109 
and accompanying text.    
41 A rare example occurred in the case of Cendant Corporation’s discovery and 
disclosures of accounting improprieties between April and October 1998. In re 
Cendant Corp. Inc. Litig., 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001).  Even then, however, the 
extent of the fraud was not fully appreciated until late September 1998, some five 
months after the first notice to the market of possible accounting problems and 
possible restatements. In all events, it seems highly unlikely that “all” of the 
details and facts of a fraud ever do emerge, even after the rare event of a trial. The 
point is that enough emerges to allow the market to readjust the price to a fair 
price.  
42 See e.g., Wool v. Tandem, 818 F. 2d 1433, 1435 (9th Cir. 1987) (the SEC 
expressed concerned about accounting improprieties). 
43 See e.g., In re Tycom Ltd. Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 2127674 *6 (D. N. H. ) 
(concerns about reduced demand, oversupply and declining prices). 
44 Examples of this type of adverse occurrence or information include: 
disappointing levels of revenue or earnings relative to investors’ expectations; 
disclosure of lower than expected prospects for future revenues and earnings, or 
known problems or weaknesses with respect to the competitive position of the 
company (in connection with the products or services offered by the company).   
45 See, for example, the extensive discussion on this issue in Jay W. Eisenhofer et 
al., Securities fraud, Stock Price Valuation, and Loss Causation: Toward a 
Corporate Finance-based Theory of Loss Causation, 59 BUS. LAW. 1419 (2004).  
Even relatively small earnings shortfalls can be important to investors.  17 C.F.R. 
§ 211, SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin: No. 99 – Materiality (Aug.12, 1999), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab99.html.  
46 As we are using the term here, “risk” does not refer to the variability of returns 
on investment or ordinary market volatility, but rather to a “factor, thing, element, 
or course involving uncertain danger; a hazard” to the company. 
47 In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2005); Greater PA Carpenters 
Pension Fund v. Whitehall Jewellers, 2005 WL 1563206 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 30 2005) 
(allegation of purchase time inflation plus pleading that defendant had previously 
issued false and misleading financial results and thereafter issued two 
restatements which did not specifically admit the fraud is sufficient to plead loss 
causation); Retsky Family Ltd. P’ship v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 1998 WL 
774678 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 1998) (market correction followed “honest” statement 
of earnings); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10-11, Dura 
Pharma., Inc. v. Brouda, 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005) (No. 03-932), also available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2003/2pet/6invit/2003-0932.pet/ami.inv.pdf  
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(“The artificial inflation will not be reduced or eliminated until the market price 
reflects the true facts that had been concealed by the fraud.  This will most 
commonly occur when the truth is revealed in whole or in part through a 
corrective disclosure.  That, however, is not the only way the fraud may be 
revealed.  Events may also effectively disclose the truth.”) (emphasis added). 
48 As to the impact of the Internet, see infra note 65.  
49 Order Granting Class Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Approval of Plan of 
Allocation, Sept. 14, 2005, at 8, In re Broadcom Corp. Sec. Litig. (C.D. Cal. 
2005) (unpublished).  See also Swack v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 383 F. Supp. 
2d 223, 243-44 (D. Mass. 2004): 
The point to be pled and proven is that the stock price declined as the 
market learned the truth; the amount of decline attributable to the market’s 
change from deceived to knowing is the measure of the plaintiff’s loss. 
But the cases cited [including Emergent Capital] are perfectly consistent 
with the possibility that the market learned the truth gradually, and in 
advance of the defendant’s eventual disclosure . . . . The plaintiff must, 
indeed, plead that the price declined as the truth emerged, but she need not 
allege that it happened on a single day. 
See also Fogarazzo v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 341 F. Supp. 2d 274, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (“plaintiffs here have alleged a number of events that operated, essentially, 
as disclosures or market corrections;” ultimate disclosure eventually was made by 
defendant); Danis v. USN Communications, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 923, 943 (N.D. 
Ill. 1999) (“the market responded to and ‘corrected’ the price of USN stock over 
the better part of a year as bits and pieces of negative information became 
available and it became apparent that USN was not capable of performing as 
originally represented”). 
50 Princeton economics professor BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN 
WALL STREET 192-93 (2003) reports, “[r]esearch indicates that, on average, stock 
prices react well in advance of unexpectedly good or unexpectedly bad earnings 
reports.”  This is also discussed in Sankarshan Acharya, Value of Latent 
Information: Alternative Event Study Methods, J. FIN., Mar. 1993, at 363-85.  
Other similar findings on the market’s anticipation of earnings events can be 
found in Stanley G. Eakins et al., Earnings Forecasts and Institutional Demand 
for Common Stock, J. APPLIED BUS. RESEARCH, January 1997, at 57+ (discussing 
the effect of whispers on earnings expectations relative to analyst earnings 
expectation numbers); see also Paul H. Malesta & Rex Thompson, Partially 
Anticipated Events: A Model of Stock Price Reactions with an Application to 
Corporate Acquisitions, 14 J. FIN. ECON., at 237-50 (1985); JOHN Y. CAMPBELL 
ET AL., THE ECONOMETRICS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 166  (1997). 
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51 Gebhardt v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 335 F.3d 824 (8th Cir. 2003).  On February 
13, 2001, Conagra issued an earnings warning and lowered earnings expectations 
for the company. Id. at 827.  The division that allegedly had been previously 
overstating its earnings was a significant component of the forecast earnings 
shortfall.  Id. The share price fell swiftly and significantly from $24.86 per share 
to $20.01 per share as a result of this earnings warning.  Id. On May 23, 2001, the 
company announced restatements of earnings for 1998, 1999 and 2000.  Id. 
Investors’ expectations had already been reduced and inflation remained in the 
stock price.  Id. The further reduction in the stock price upon disclosure of the 
restatements was only $0.57 per share.  Id. The defendants argued and the district 
court concluded based on the small price reaction that the information was not 
material.  Id. at 831.  The 8th Circuit overruled the district court, noting, in part, 
that the share price had already fallen prior to the restatement and refusing at the 
motion to dismiss stage "to attach dispositive significance to the stock's price 
movements absent sufficient facts and expert testimony, which cannot be 
considered at this procedural juncture, to put this information in its proper 
context."  Id. at 832.  
52 541 F.2d 1335, 1341-46 (9th  Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring). 
53 818 F.2d 1433, 1436-37 (9th Cir. 1986).   
54 See, e.g., Fogarrazo v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 341 F. Supp. 2d 274, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004): 
[I]nflated stock prices can lead to a loss in one of two ways.  First, there 
can be an external correction to the market, such as a corrective disclosure 
. . . . Second, there can be a market correction, where ordinary market 
forces affect the rate of artificial inflation. If, for example, the normal 
functioning of the securities market causes the inflationary effect to 
dissipate over time, a customer who buys and sells at inflated prices will 
still suffer a loss based on the inflated price at the time of purchase so long 
as the price was less inflated at the time of sale.  
One court has opined that this concept applies only in market manipulation cases, 
but there is questionable economic basis for that distinction. See In re IPO Sec. 
Litig., 383 F. Supp. 2d 566, 2005 WL 743440 at *7 (S.D.N.Y.).   
55 We use “earnings” for simplicity as a proxy for the various measures analysts in 
fact use (operating earnings, earnings after taxes, cash flow, free cash flow, 
forward earnings, trailing earnings and other relevant measures of corporate 
performance per share). Moreover, finance theory includes the use of discount 
rates to calculate present value of projected earnings, but again, that level of detail 
is unnecessary to the point here.   
56 See, e.g., STEPHEN A. ROSS ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 137-39 (3d Ed. 1993). 
See generally id. at 121-39. 
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57 If this sounds like a “market manipulation” concept, it is. While “market 
manipulation” under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78(j)(b) 
10(b)5-a and 10(b)5-c, is a term of art referring to practices such as wash sales, 
matched order or rigged prices. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 
(1976).  Nonetheless as an economic matter, a 10b-5(b) defendant has inherently 
counted on market forces to react to and affect price. Thus, when the company 
makes contradictory announcements or leaks information in order to “guide the 
stock down gently,” it is effectively manipulating the market to accomplish its 
goals.  Those who work in this area, including the three authors, are unsurprised 
when discovery turns up internal company documents in which management 
explicitly states it intends to engage in this practice.  Defendants may be 
motivated by either short-term incentive to prop up their share price (for example, 
to personally sell some shares before the truth is revealed; to allow the company 
to raise capital at more favorable terms; to avoid being terminated; or to realize 
immediate bonuses). The company may hope to forestall the day of reckoning by, 
for a time, effectively “covering up” the foreseeable economic losses that will 
eventually result from the fraud.     
58 The market will assess disclosures and announcements differently, depending 
upon a variety of factors. Molly Mercer, How Do Investors Assess the Credibility 
of Management Disclosures?, ACCT. HORIZONS, Sept. 1, 2004, at 185 et seq.: 
“Why are some management disclosures more credible than others? [A] 
disclosure's credibility is influenced by: [1] Situational incentives at the time of 
the disclosure; [2] management's credibility; [3] the degree of external and 
internal assurance; [4] various characteristics of the disclosure, including its 
precision, venue, timing, amount of supporting information, and inherent 
plausibility.”  Moreover, “[m]anagement disclosures vary in their degree of 
precision. For example, management's earnings forecasts appear as precise point 
estimates, less precise range estimates, or even more vague one-sided maximum 
or minimum estimates. Several authors argue that imprecise disclosures signal 
management's uncertainty and will be viewed as less credible than more precise 
disclosures.”  
59 See, e.g., Berry v. Valence Tech. Inc., 175 F.3d 699 (9th Cir. 1999).  
60 In re IPO Sec. Litig., 297 F. Supp 2d 668, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  It is not clear 
whether the court views this analysis to have survived Dura. See infra note 84.  
61 In re Imperial Credit Industries, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1014 (C.D.Cal. 
2003); In re Gaming Lottery Sec. Litig., 2000 WL 1923125 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
16, 2000); RMED Int’l., Inc. v. Sloan’s Supermarkets, Inc., 2000 WL 310352 *6 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2000), aff’d 2000 WL 420458 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2000); In re 
Oracle Sec. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 1176, 1181 (N.D.Cal. 1993). 
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62 Statistical significance has more than one meaning and is not a talismanic term, 
however.  See David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on 
Statistics, in FED. JUD. CNTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 83, 
123-27 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing practical significance); ALAN STUART ET AL., 
KENDALL’S ADVANCED THEORY OF STATISTICS, VOLUME 2A: CLASSICAL 
INFERENCE & THE LINEAR MODEL 193 (6th ed. 1999) (“This numerical 
convenience [rule of thumb criteria for statistical significance] has persisted long 
beyond its hour of need.”); LAWRENCE LAPIN, STATISTICS FOR MODERN BUSINESS 
DECISIONS 186 (1978) (“A decision rule must be chosen that will provide a lower 
probability of the more serious error . . . . He [the decision-maker] should 
therefore be wary of setting Alpha [the criteria for significance] and Beta at 
arbitrary or traditional levels.”); DONALD A. BERRY & BERNARD W. LINDGREN,
STATISTICS: THEORY AND METHODS 423-27 (2d ed. 1996) (arguing against a fixed 
criteria for statistical significance and for considerations of practical significance).     
63 The underlying principle is that if truth had been disclosed timely, the stock 
price adjustments that occurred at the end would have occurred over time and 
earlier in time. Cornell & Morgan, supra note 24; John Koslow, Estimating 
Aggregate Damages in Class Action Litigation Under Rule 10b-5 for Purposes of 
Settlement, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 811, 819-25 (1991); Janet Cooper Alexander, 
The Value of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1421, 
1426-27 (1994); FINNERTY & PUSHNER, supra note 24 at 8-11; 1195-98 
(discussing adjustment of corrective events over time using a “comparable-stock 
index that recognizes both industry and market-wide influences,” and adjustment 
for “firm-specific factors that can be directly attributed to company 
announcements that are not related to the fraud” using the “backwardation” 
approach – based on percentage returns not absolute dollar changes). 
64 We refer to various “stages” for simplification; protocols are set a priori and 
regressions and other processes in each stage may be run simultaneously. Event 
studies can vary in practice, including differences in assumptions and levels of 
investigation and, consequently, different event studies can result in significantly 
different levels of precision.  However, all event studies tend to include event 
identification, a market index choice and a statistical analysis of the events of 
interest.  See, for example, M. Laurentius Marais & Katherine Schipper, Event 
Study Methods: Detecting and Measuring the Security Price Effects of 
Disclosures and Interventions, in ROMAN L. WEIL ET AL., LITIGATION SERVICES 
HANDBOOK: THE ROLE OF THE FINANCIAL EXPERT, 2005 CUMULATIVE 
SUPPLEMENT 17A (3d ed. 2005) (discussing event study methods and the use of 
event study methodology in litigation).  Hereinafter we use the term “event” in a 
technical sense to mean the entry of information into the marketplace that is new 
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and potentially material.  We are not using it in the colloquial sense of something 
that takes place or an occurrence.   
65 See Werner Antweiler & Murray Frank, Is All That Talk Just Noise? The 
Information Content of Internet Stock Message Boards, J. FIN., June 2004, at 
1259-1294 (“We find that stock messages help predict market volatility.  Their 
effect of stock returns is statistically significant but economically small.”).
66 This is also known as the residual returns method. Cornell & Morgan, supra 
note 24 at 899-900; Koslow, supra note 62 at 819-25; Alexander, supra note 62 at 
1426-27; FINNERTY & PUSHNER, supra note 24 at 8-11 (uses backwardization 
approach based on percentage returns). 
67 To the lay jury, the fact that stock prices are tracked in percentage terms and all 
experts on both sides of the fence use percentages in conducting event studies is 
probably a sufficient basis for understanding why this technique is used.  But 
there are also technical reasons for it.  Extensive literature exists, particularly with 
respect to option pricing, regarding modeling publicly traded security price 
movements as a “jump-diffusion process.”  A jump-diffusion process is one 
where stock prices move with a “random walk” composed of small movements in 
the stock price over time, coupled with sudden jumps up or down in the price 
series that are observed and associated with identified events.  See, e.g., Clive 
W.J. Granger, The Present and Future of Empirical Finance, FIN. ANALYSTS J., 
July/August 2005, at 15-18 (discussing jump-diffusion processes in the context of 
modeling security price movements and security returns); CAROL ALEXANDER,
MARKET MODELS: A GUIDE TO FINANCIAL DATA ANALYSIS 66-67; 286-87; 320-
22; 430-31; 440-42 (2001) (discussing the use of the natural log transformation to 
capture the diffusion process and events to control for jumps in stock prices at 
specific points in time); PHILIP HANS FRANSES, TIME SERIES MODELS FOR 
BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC FORECASTING 128-30 (1998) (discussing the need to 
control for sudden changes in stock prices); RUEY S. TSAY, ANALYSIS OF 
FINANCIAL TIME SERIES 16 (2002) (showing returns based on daily log returns 
and percentage returns); Id. at 244 (discussing a “jump diffusion model proposed 
by Kou (2000)” to model stock price movements); Javier F. Navas, Calculation of 
Volatility in a Jump-Diffusion Model, J.  DERIVATIVES, December 2003 
(discussing the portion of volatility related to jumps). 
68 Adjustments for compression over time may be made.  Compression is 
equivalent to saying the “bigger they are the harder they fall.”  The following 
example illustrates compounding.  Suppose two events of equal importance result 
in a loss of 75% in the share price.  The temptation is to divide the percentage 
drop in half and say that each event accounts for 37.5% of the decline.  If one of 
the events was related to the fraud and one was not, then this simplistic approach 
would say that the inflation in the share price prior to the event is 37.5%.  
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However, two 37.5% events would combine to only cause a 61% decline in the 
share price (1-(1-.375)*(1-.375)).  The individual percentage impact of each event 
would have to be 50% in order for the total decline after the two events to be 
75%.  Mathematically, 75% = 1-(1-.5)*(1-.5).  Thus 50% not 37.5% is the proper 
measure of the inflation in the share price, prior to the event.    
69 Cornell & Morgan, supra note 24 at 905-06.  When a fraud is revealed slowly 
over time, the event study researcher will “extend the observation window 
surrounding the disclosure date . . . . The window begins far enough in advance of 
the disclosure for the analyst to be reasonably confident that no significant 
information leakage has occurred . . . . The window ends at a date when the 
analyst feels confident that most of the information is publicly available . . .”.  
Princeton economics professor Burton G. Malkiel, supra note 50 at 192-93, 
reports, “[r]esearch indicates that, on average, stock prices react well in advance 
of unexpectedly good or unexpectedly bad earnings reports.” This is also 
discussed in Acharya, supra note 50 at 363-85.  Other similar findings on the 
market’s anticipation of earnings events can be found in Eakins, supra note 50 at 
57+ (discussing the effect of whispers on earnings expectations relative to analyst 
earnings expectation numbers); see also Malesta & Thompson, supra note 50 at 
237-50; and CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 50 at 166.  A general article on event 
timing and uncertainty is Clifford Ball & Walter Torous, Investigating Security-
Price Performance in the Presence of Event-Date Uncertainty, 22 J. FIN. ECON.
123-53 (1988).  Similarly, Srinivasan Ragothaman & Bruce  Bublitz, An 
Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Asset Writedown Disclosures on Stockholder 
Wealth, QUARTERLY J. BUS. & ECON., Jun. 1996, at 32+, state, “[s]pecifying a 
date when information reaches the market is not always feasible; information can 
reach the market gradually through many sources . . . . Thus, in all prior studies 
the precise identification of the event date is a problem; the market seems to have 
alternative sources of information.”  As “event windows” are expanded, however, 
the power of the statistical inferences diminishes.  Thus, it is important not to 
extend an event window beyond the period in which the meaning of the 
information itself appears to be unfolding in the marketplace. Dmitry Krivin, 
Robert Patton, Erica Rose & David Tabak, Determination of the Appropriate 
Event Window Length in Individual Stock Event Studies, National Economic 
Research Associates (4 November 2003), Working Paper, available at 
www.nera.com/publication.asp?p_ID=1287.     
70 See infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
71 Further, the event study may extend beyond the single day of bad news. Stock 
prices tend to continue to “drift” or react to additional clarifying information 
entering the market after a bad news event. An event that triggers a substantial 
stock price change, especially a negative change, can cause increased volatility in 
46
 
the days or weeks immediately following that event.  Academic literature on this 
phenomenon in security markets is developing and is well beyond the scope of 
this paper.  [for surveys of the evidence, concepts and methods of modeling 
changing volatility in financial markets see, e.g., TSAY, supra note 67 at 79-125;  
CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 50 at 479-98; JAMES DOUGLAS HAMILTON, TIMES 
SERIES MARKETS 657-76 (2004)]. In other words, movement in the stock price on 
the day of an extremely negative event is often not the end of the story and the 
stock price will continue to bounce around for some period thereafter. Such an 
event introduces greater uncertainty in the valuation of the security and greater 
investigative efforts on the part of market participants in the following days.       
72 The results of such quantitative analyses can be expressed as differences or 
deltas in revenues, operating earnings, cash flows, or other financial measures or 
metrics that, according to securities analysts, drive share prices for the particular 
firm at particular points in time.  In the context of interpreting events and 
information, see Cornell & Morgan, supra note 24 at 894-97 (discussing the 
construction of an “equivalent disclosure price” as an estimate of the true value 
based on a “detailed investigation of the facts as they existed at the time of the 
misrepresentation or omission and at the time of disclosure.”) 
73 Another context in which economics might be in play is in the appointment of 
lead plaintiff. The PSLRA requires that lead plaintiff be based on who has the 
“largest financial interest” in the litigation. 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii).  This 
determination is sometimes made based strictly on looking at investment loss, not 
inflationary loss.  This appears to be so because investment loss is viewed as a 
suitable proxy for damages in this very early stage of a case, where considerations 
of efficiency and speed are paramount.  See, e.g., HBOC v. McKesson, 97 F. 
Supp. 2d 993 (N.D.Cal. 1999). Nonetheless, the concept of “largest financial 
interest” adds another element of terminological confusion.   
74 Robbins v. Kroger Props., Inc., 16 F.3d 1441, 1447 (11th Cir. 1997);  See also 
Bruschi v. Brown, 876 F. 2d 1526, 1530-32 (11th Cir. 1989); Huddleston v. 
Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549-56 (5th Cir. 1981). As a theoretical 
economic matter, however, concepts of materiality, loss causation and damages 
are all said to involve essentially the same inquiry. Daniel K. Fishel, Use of 
Modern Finance Theory, supra n. 9. 
75In the securities area, the policy concern of Congress and the courts is to avoid 
holding the defendants liable for the full investment loss that plaintiffs may 
experience in the market, such that responsibility is limited solely to the loss 
caused by fraud and not by other forces.  See Fox, Demystifying Causation, supra 
note 18; William Prosser, Torts (4th ed. 1971), 236-290. The PSLRA specifically 
requires that recovery be limited to losses caused by the fraud. 15 USC §78u-
4(b)(4) 
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76 Palsgraf v. Long Is. R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
77 William Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CAL. L. REV. 369, 375 
(1950). 
78 See Fox, Demystifying Causation, supra note 18, at 514 (“the twin requirements 
of transaction causation and loss causation fit very poorly with fraud on the 
market actions”). For other contexts in which the same bifurcated language is 
used, see e.g., Martin v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 163 Ill. 2d 33, 58-61, 643 NE 
2d 734, 746-47 (1994). 
79 Some courts framed the test as whether the fraud was a “substantial factor” in 
bringing about the loss (a common formulation of proximate cause in other 
contexts) or, similarly, whether the fraud was a “substantial contributing factor” 
even though not “the sole cause of plaintiff’s loss.”  Miller v. Asensio & Co., 364 
F.3d 223, 232 (4th Cir. 2004); Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 187-
87  (3d Cir. 2000); Caremark Inc. v. Coram Healthcare Corp., 113 F.3d 645, 648-
49 (7th Cir. 1997).  This expression of the test would seem at least to gesture in 
the right direction, to the extent it suggests that loss causation could properly be 
found when a price decline resulted in part in an inability to recoup overpayment.  
But to the extent the analysis focuses on investment loss as a whole, it misses the 
mark.       
80 We say irrelevant because, as we have shown, a foreseeable consequence of 
securities fraud is that market forces will operate on the fraud and, depending on 
their direction, will cause investors to experience inflationary losses or gains.  
With gingerly resort to the perplexing variety of language about proximate cause - 
since we seek a clear vantage point rather tan explication of the intricacies of the 
concept - it is hornbook law that a condition that exists at the time of the tort 
(here, market forces) or an occurrence that is reasonably foreseeable at the time of 
the tort  (here, market reactions) cannot constitute an intervening or superseding 
cause that breaks the chain of causation. Put differently and still in the language 
of proximate cause, market reactions are within the scope of the risk that the actor 
undertakes in the first instance and are foreseeable. See generally RESTATEMENT 
OF TORTS (SECOND) §447; §442B; Prosser, LAW OF TORTS CH. 7 (4th ed. 1971) 
81 Our purpose is not to review the history the splits in the circuits or the 
background of Dura itself, which is widely available, see e.g., Brief for Petitioner, 
Dura Pharma., Inc. v. Brouda, 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005) (No. 03-932), also 
available at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/03-932/03-
932.mer.pet.pdf; Brief for Respondent, Dura Pharma., Inc. v. Brouda, 125 S. Ct. 
1627 (2005)(No. 03-932), also available at 
http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/03-932/03-932.mer.resp.pdf; 
Brief of the United States United States as Amicus Curiae, Dura Pharma., Inc. v. 
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Brouda, 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005) (No. 03-932), also available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2003/2pet/6invit/2003-0932.pet/ami.inv.pdf 
82 Dura Pharma., Inc. v. Brouda, 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005).  
83 Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F. 3d 165, 185 (3rd Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1149 (2001); Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1448 (11th 
Cir. 1997). 
84 Lentell v. Merrill Lynch, Co., 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2005).  Lentell has been 
read as establishing a draconian standard for pleading loss causation. See Ryan, 
Yet Another Bough on the “Judicial Oak”: The Second Circuit Clarifies Inquiry 
Notice and Its Loss Causation Requirement under the PSLRA in Lentell v. Merrill 
Lynch & Co., 79 St. John’s Law Rev. 484 *518. The case can be read, however, 
as acknowledging that dissipation can be caused in any of the ways we have 
described, except, perhaps, solely by the operation of market forces on the fraud.  
Lentell did not require that the prior falsehood be disclosed to establish causation; 
a “concealed risk” had to be disclosed, which would typically be a risk to the 
company’s financial health or its prospects, not a scheme or falsehood per se. 
Market forces operating on the fraud was recognized, pre-Lentell, in lower courts 
in the Second Circuit, but its current fate there is unclear.  See In re IPO Sec. 
Litig., 297 F. Supp 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). But see IPO Sec. Litig. v. Credit 
Suisse First Boston, 2005 WL 1162445 (S.D.N.Y.) (citing the materialization of 
concealed risk language, but holding that post-Dura, under Lentell, the fraudulent 
scheme itself has to be disclosed); IPO Sec. Litig. v. Credit Suisse First Boston 
Corp., 2005 WL 1529659 (S.D.N.Y.) (noting that falsity only needs to be 
disclosed if the cause of action involves a false opinion in the first instance; 
otherwise materialization of the concealed condition or event need not involve 
disclosure of falsity); Accord, Teamsters Local 445 Freight Division Pension 
Fund v. Bombardier Inc., 2005 WL 2148919 (S.D.N.Y.). It is also of note that 
Lentell involved only an analyst’s opinion, not an issuer’s representation, and that 
court clearly seemed to think that all material risks of the investment and to the 
company had been disclosed in any event.   
85 Lefler & Kleidon, supra note 24; Lyle Roberts & Paul Chalmers, Shining a 
Light or Cursing the Darkness? – The Impact of Dura Pharmaceuticals., Inc. v. 
Broudo, 1505 PRACT. LAW. INST. 343 (Sept. 2005); Fox, Demystifying Causation, 
supra note 18;  John C. Coffee, Loss Causation After Dura: Something for 
Everyone, N.Y. L. J., May 19, 2005 (App. ___) (hereinafter Coffee, Something for 
Everyone); Alan Schulman & Niki Mendoza, Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo – The 
Least of All Evils, 1505 PRACT. LAW. INST. 271 (Sept. 2005). 
86 Dura Pharma., Inc. v. Brouda, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 1633 (2005). 
87 Id.  
88 Id. at 1634. 
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89 Id. at 1633 (emphasis added).   
90 The court was clearly invited to do so.  Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Brouda, 125 S. Ct. 
1627 (2005). 
91 Fox, Understanding Dura, supra note 26. 
92 Coffee, Something for Everyone, supra note 85. The Court was dealing with an 
“apples and oranges” problem. Under the Ninth Circuit’s pleading standard, a 
pleader would allege he paid too much and then that the stock’s absolute price had 
declined, with no explanation of what component of that absolute decline, if any, 
constituted loss to that investor (inflation ‘apples’ to price ‘oranges’) Without 
further economic explanation of the linkage between an absolute price decline and 
dissipation of inflated value, one is left with an “apples to oranges” disconnect. If 
a pleader shows she paid too much and is unable to recoup that over-payment, 
(inflation ‘apples’ and dissipation of inflation ‘apples’), that is the right 
comparison and the causal link is clear. 
93 Many, many permutations favorable to the defense have purportedly been 
discovered in Dura, see e.g., Lefler & Kleidon, supra note 24; see also Roberts & 
Chalmers, supra note 85. 
94 It has even been suggested that, without ever mentioning the case, the Supreme 
Court implicitly overruled parts of Wool v. Tandem, 818 F. 2d 1433, 1437 (9th 
Cir. 1987), Lefler & Kleidon, supra note 23. 
95 See supra note 85.  
96 Dura Pharma., Inc. v. Brouda, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 1632 (2005) (underlining added; 
italics in original). 
97 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 548A(b). The cited sentence, in a phrase 
omitted by the Court, goes on to state that the depreciation of the value of the 
shares “is the obviously foreseeable result of the facts misrepresented.” This is 
essentially the same causation standard we advocate, namely, reasonable 
foreseeability; but neither the Restatement nor the Court dealt with the question 
whether, as a matter of economic principle, reaction of market forces on price and 
therefore on inflation is always foreseeable.     
98 Traders who sell before full revelation of the truth are sometimes referred to as 
“in and out” traders, meaning they bought and sold the relevant stock during the 
class period but prior to “the” disclosure. Whether or not they have experienced 
loss should depend entirely upon whether the inflationary component of the stock 
price was lower on the day they sold than on the day they purchased, but under 
the “truth then drop” standard, they would never have loss.  The reasoning is that 
if loss causation can only be shown by a corrective disclosure followed by a price 
drop, then prior to the disclosure, the inflation in the price was exactly the same, 
day after day, every single day of the class period. If the inflationary component 
was identical from day 1 to the day of “the” disclosure, then all prior sellers 
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automatically must be deemed to have recouped the inflationary component of the 
price. Notwithstanding the fact that Dura contains no such discussion, some have 
argued that Dura must be read to stand for that proposition, Lefler & Kleidon, 
supra n. 24 at *294 (Dura “expressly precludes any recovery based on stock price 
declines that occur before the market learned about the fraud.”). 
99 What is more, some argue that the “truth then drop” standard allows for only 
one methodology for computing damages, sometimes referred to as the “dollar 
drop” method. One form of that approach looks solely at the inflationary 
component of the price on the day of disclosure in dollar terms, rather than 
percentages, and then concludes that is the sole measure of damages.  In other 
words, damages consist only of the dollar decline in price on the day of the 
disclosure. Proponents reason that no one who sold before that date has damages 
at all.  Taken further, the argument would be that everyone who held on that date 
or sold that instant suffered a single measurable “dollars and cents” amount of 
loss.  The reasoning in support of this theory is attenuated. First, the “dollar drop” 
on “the” disclosure day can accurately capture the inflationary component of price 
only on that one day. But what if the inflationary component has changed over 
time, which it almost always will? And what if the market and industry had 
predicted a price increase on the day of disclosure? Would dollar drop on that day 
capture the entire inflationary loss? Indeed, “dollar drop” proponents admit that 
economic theory may demand that percentage terms be used to measure loss, but 
declare that Dura has overruled economic theory in that regard. Lefler & Kleidon, 
supra note 23.     
100 Collier v. Asksys Ltd., 2005 WL 1949868, *13 (D.Conn.) (“any losses 
associated with …pre-revelation [transactions] could not be causally linked to the 
misstatement and omissions because the truth relating to [the misstatements] had 
not yet been revealed to the market”.); Fraternity Fund., Ltd. v. Beacon Hill Asset 
Mgmt. LLC, 376 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (disclosure of prior fraud 
establishes loss; if purchaser had sold before the “truth” about prior fraud had 
been told, no loss); see also In re Compuserve Sec. Litig., 386 F. Supp. 2d 913 
(E.D. Mi. 2005) (corrective disclosure must “publicly air” the fraud). At one 
extreme, the defense argued that  “the corrective disclosure” must literally be the 
“linguistic mirror image of the alleged fraud.” That extreme was rejected, In re 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 2007004 (D.N.J.), but the court did 
require corrective statements that related fairly directly to the fraud.    
101 See In re Acterna Corporation Securities Litigation, 378 F. Supp. 2d 561 (D. 
Md. 2005). Another instructive case is D.E. & J. L.P. v. Conaway, 2005 WL 
1386448 (6th Cir. June 10, 2005), plaintiffs sued K-Mart and its auditors alleging 
that Kmart mislead investors about its expenses, future sales, and inventory. They 
alleged that the effort to shore up its stock price began to fail in late 2001 and the 
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company had to report that its sales had been flat, and later, sales actually 
declined. On January 22, 2002, the company filed for bankruptcy and several days 
later disclosed a whistleblower report that cited serious concerns about its 
accounting methods and financial results. Restatements and charges attributable to 
the alleged fraud followed.  A class action was filed on behalf of purchasers from 
May 2001 to January 22, 2002. The lower court dismissed on the ground that 
plaintiff only pled “purchase time inflation,” did not plead that the alleged fraud 
became known to the market “on any particular day,” did not estimate damages, 
and did not “connect” the alleged fraud with the “ultimate” disclosures and loss. 
The Sixth Circuit upheld the dismissal, stating that an announcement of 
bankruptcy followed by a stock price drop, without an allegation that the 
bankruptcy disclosed the actual prior misrepresentations to the market, was 
insufficient to meet the “truth then drop” version of the Dura test. This decision 
clearly requires a corrective disclosure unveiling the fraud. Perhaps an event study 
would have established that materialization of concealed risk began with leakage 
of information in October, but on the face of the decision, the Court does not 
appear to have been met with that argument or an explanation that the bankruptcy 
itself rendered plaintiffs unable to recoup an inflationary component in the price.  
Hence, the court retreated to the comfort of the per se rule. 
102 See e.g., Respondent’s Brief, supra note __ at __. 
103 See e.g., In Re Acterna Corp. Sec. Litig., 378 F. Supp. 2d 561 (D. Md. 2005);  
In Re Tellium Sec. Litig.,  
104 In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2005).  However, the court also 
made an observation that there was no revelation of the company’s true financial 
health before a certain date and commented that the stock price drop before that 
date could not be considered causally related to the fraud.  Id. This is inconsistent 
with the economic principles we have discussed and would suggest “in and out” 
traders might be out of luck, but the court was merely making an observation 
about language in the complaint, not a definitive ruling on the general subject of 
in and out traders.  
105 In In re Greater PA Carpenters Pension Fund v. Whitehall Jewellers Inc.,
2005 WL 61480 (N.D. Ill.),  the plaintiff pled that Whitehall engaged in various 
fraudulent transactions to inflate Whitehall’s inventory balances, net income and 
earnings per share and reported the falsely inflated income and earnings figures.  
Id. at *1.  On several of these announcements, the stock price dropped.  Id. at *5.  
The company ultimately issued two restatements of its financial statements, 
neither of which revealed the prior falsehoods.  Id. The stock price did not fall 
upon these restatements. Id. Ultimately, the prior falsehoods were revealed. Id. 
Before Dura, the Court held that the plaintiffs had adequately pled loss causation. 
Id. After Dura, the defendants argued that dismissal was required because 
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plaintiffs had not pled “truth, then drop.” The lower court noted the language of 
Dura that pleading loss causation “is not meant to impose a great burden upon a 
plaintiff” and that plaintiff had pled leakage and price drops, which sufficed. In re 
JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 1705766 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (plaintiff 
alleged there that defendants misrepresented the value of inventory and goodwill, 
as well as product demand. As JDS made disclosures of its actual financial 
situation as it related to those three indicators, among others, the stock price fell. 
There was no disclosure of fraud. The court recognized that disclosure of the 
company’s financial condition, not of the fraudulent scheme, was sufficient.) See 
also Rocker Management LLC v. Lernout & Hauspie Speech Prod., 2005 WL 
1366025 (D. N.J., June 8, 2005) (in a short seller case, allegations that false 
financial statements inflated the stock, causing plaintiffs injury at the time of 
cover, were sufficient; court distinguishing inflation at the time of cover from 
inflation at the time of purchase for purposes of Dura, but emphasizes the fact 
intense nature of the causation inquiry); Zelman v. JDS Uniphase Corp., 376 F. 
Supp. 2d 956 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (plaintiff need only allege that defendants’ pre-
class period misrepresentations had “something to do with” plaintiffs’ alleged 
losses). 
106 In In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 278, 2005 WL 1527674 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005), the court held that an allegation that a corrective disclosure 
caused a price drop is not necessary to pleading loss causation; it is sufficient to 
allege that a concealed risk materialized when the company experienced a 
liquidity crisis. The Court reaffirmed that ruling a month later. In re Parmalat 
Securities Litigation, 376 F. Supp. 2d 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).  See also Teamsters 
Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier Inc., 2005 WL 2148919 *12, 
n155 (S.D.N.Y.) (materialization of concealed risk allegations are sufficient to 
plead loss causation; no corrective disclosure needed).  
107 Order Granting Class Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Approval of Plan of 
Allocation, Sept. 14, 2005, at 8, In re Broadcom Corp. Sec. Litig. (C.D. Cal. 
2005) (unpublished).  The Court approved a Plan of Allocation that allowed 
claims by “in and out” traders, rejecting the notion that Dura had proscribed such 
recoveries. (All three authors of this article were involved on the plaintiffs’ side in 
the Broadcom case.) In the settlement context, it seems highly likely that until 
there is definitive precedent in the relevant jurisdiction that no loss ever occurs 
before “the” disclosure, courts will approve Plans that permit claims by “in and 
out” traders, particularly since defendants typically will want settlements to be as 
broad as possible. “In and out claims” will sometimes be weighted lower than 
those of “post-disclosure” sellers, to account for the possibly more difficult proof. 
See also In re Worldcom Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 2293190 (S.D.N.Y.); Maley v. 
Global Techs. Corp., 186 F. Supp. 2d 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); In re MicroStrategy, 
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Inc., Sec. Litig., 148 F. Supp. 2d 654, 668 (E.D.Va. 2001); In re Ikon Office 
Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 166, 184 (E.D.Pa. 2000); In re Sapiens Sec. 
Litig., No. 94 Civ. 3315 (RPP), 1996 WL 689360, *2 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 27, 1996).   
108 148 F. 3d. 760 (7th Cir. 1998). 
109 Posner also discussed securities fraud and opined that when a plaintiff buys 
stock based on a misrepresentation, and then the market tanks, there is no loss 
causation because the loss that occurred (investment loss) is not the kind of loss 
that the securities fraud law intends to prevent. The court cited to its own decision 
in Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F. 2d 680, cert denied, 496 U.S. 906 (1990).  
In Bastian, which is frequently mis-cited as a fraud on the market case, the 
Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a complaint alleging that the defendants' 
fraudulent statements had induced the plaintiffs to invest in oil and gas limited 
partnerships that ultimately became worthless, because the complaint did not 
allege that "the plaintiffs' loss was due to the defendants' fraud" rather than (for 
example) "the unexpected drop in oil prices." Id. at 684.  Interestingly, however, 
Posner did not discuss in either decision whether the result would have been 
different, as he said it would have for Movitiz, if the securities buyer had sought 
not the entire investment loss, but only the overpayment that he could no longer 
recoup (inflationary loss). That is the logical conclusion from both opinions.     
110 This is completely consistent with traditional tort law. Prosser comments that 
forces will not be considered intervening when they are “caused or set in motion 
by the operation of the defendants’ conduct upon the existing situation—as where 
his spark ignites gasoline vapor already present…since their origin is not external 
and independent and they are to be attributed to the defendant himself.” PROSSER,
supra note 80 at 271.  
111 But individual damages issues – exactly when did any given plaintiff sell and 
what would an expert say about whether inflation had been fully dissipated at that 
time – should be decided at an evidentiary stage, not on the pleadings. See Fox, 
Demystifying Causation, supra note 18; cf. Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 
F.3d 165  (3d Cir. 2000);  Zelman v. JDS Uniphase Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d 956, 
973 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (“the substantiality of the link between misstatement and 
loss is not a question appropriate for consideration on a motion to dismiss.”) 
112 The Supreme Court punted on the point, assuming, for “sake of argument” that 
particularity was not required.  Dura Pharma., Inc. v. Brouda, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 
1633 (2005).  
 113 Be aware, however, that defense counsel have suggested that even in a clear 
case of a large stock price drop upon a disclosure of truth, Rule 11 may not be 
satisfied without an event study having been done to examine the statistical 
significance of that drop. This is clearly the next battleground for defense counsel.  
Lefler & Kleidon, supra note 23. 
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